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ABSTRACT
TRINETR: An Intrusion Detection Alert Management and Analysis System
by Jinqiao Yu
Intrusion detection system (IDS) is a software system or hardware device deployed to monitor
network and host activities including data flows and information accesses etc. to capture
suspicious activities. In recent years, IDS has begun to gain wide acceptance as a necessary and
worthwhile investment in security. But current IDS products present many flaws including alert
flooding, excessive false alerts, isolated alerts, lack of context awareness and security decision
support etc. Many of these problems are severely hindering them from being used more
efficiently in practice.

To make the use of IDS products more efficient and generated alerts more accurate, this
dissertation work - an intrusion detection alert management and analysis project, dubbed as
TRINETR, has been developed at Concurrent Engineering Research Center of West Virginia
University. A novel alert management and analysis architecture is presented in the project. The
architecture is composed of three key parts: (1) Alert Aggregation, (2) Knowledge-based Alert
Evaluation and Security Decision Support, and (3) Alert Correlation. The project is aimed at
reducing alert overload by aggregating alerts from multiple sensors to generate condensed views,
reducing false positive alerts by integrating network and host system information into alert
evaluation process, providing appropriate security solution suggestions regarding the evaluated
alerts to facilitate decision making, and correlating intrusion events to find the logical relations
among them. Implementation and testing of a prototype system are also reported in this
dissertation as well as a study of application of time series analysis approach to alert correlation.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

For the past three decades, especially after the advent of internet era, computer network has
become a critical element of modern society. Computer networks not only have global reach,
more importantly, they have a broad and deep impact on virtually every aspect of today’s society.
Network systems are principal enabling agents in business, industry, government, and defense.
Today, almost every business sector and government department all depends on a vast array of
computer networks operating on local, national, and global scale. This pervasive societal
dependency on computer networks magnifies the consequence of intrusions, accidents, and
failures, and amplifies the critical importance of confidentiality, integrity and availability of
these enabling computerized information networks.

Three essential properties of information networks: confidentiality, integrity and
availability.

Confidentiality means information should only be accessed by someone authorized to do so. For
some types of information, confidentiality is a very important attribute. Examples include
research data, medical and insurance records, new product specifications, and corporate
investment strategies. In some instances, there may be a legal obligation to protect the privacy of
individuals. This is particularly true for banks and loan companies; debt collectors; businesses
that extend credit to their customers or issue credit cards; hospitals, doctors' offices, and medical

1

testing laboratories; individuals or agencies that offer services such as psychological counseling
or drug treatment; and agencies that collect taxes.

Integrity means that information should be kept in its integrity and modified in an expected way.
When information is modified in unexpected ways, the result is known as loss of integrity. This
means that unauthorized changes are made to information, whether by human error or intentional
tampering. Integrity is particularly important for critical safety and financial data used for
activities such as electronic funds transfers, air traffic control, and financial accounting.

Availability means information and service should be available whenever it is needed by
authorized users. Availability is often the most important attribute in service-oriented businesses
that depend on information (e.g., airline schedules and online inventory systems). Availability of
the network itself is important to anyone whose business or education relies on a network
connection. When a user cannot get access to the network or specific services provided on the
network, they experience a denial of service.

Confidentiality, integrity and availability are three principal properties of an information network.
To maintain these key properties, organizations are deploying a vast array of hardware
appliances and software systems as well as other security mechanisms to harden valuable
information networks. But the open nature of Internet makes these networks accessible to public
to certain extent unless they are not connected to Internet, which makes them isolated from the
rest of the world. On the other hand, even a totally secluded network is still accessible to its
authorized users including disgruntled ones who may compromise the network in some sense.
These threats from authorized users constitute insider threats.
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Access to information network doesn’t render malicious intrusion attacks provided the network
is perfect. Unfortunately, today’s information network is still not very reliable not to mention
“perfect”. As a matter of fact, it is presenting a huge amount of diversified vulnerabilities. These
vulnerabilities could be exploited by all kinds of users from curious teenagers, intelligent hackers
to organized cyber criminal groups and even hostile countries, to achieve all kinds of purposes
from teenagers’ trivial knowledge swanks to planned military attacks. As a consequence, during
past several years, we have seen an upsoaring amount of cyber incidents including probes,
worms, DNS attacks, email viruses, buffer overflow attacks, and spiteful penetrations etc.

Network Security Truth and Facts

With the advances in network and all other related techniques, enterprise information networks
are getting more and more complex. Today, a typical moderate network may consist of router,
switch, firewall, IDS (Intrusion Detection System), VPN (Virtual Private Networks), DMZ
(Demilitarized Zone), VLAN (Virtual LAN), wireless access point and dozens of servers
providing mail, file, authentication, and directory services. These hardware appliances and
software systems may come from different vendors and operate in different system environments.
Even the same software system, for instance, operating systems may have different versions. But
as the complexity of enterprise network increases, it leads to all kinds of vulnerabilities that
inevitably exist in many aspects of contemporary enterprise networks. Unlike traditional
standalone or closed-box systems, the Internet’s open nature makes many enterprise networks
containing valuable or sensitive data information accessible to malicious users to certain extent.
For instance, many enterprise department networks have open ports for web hosting or
information sharing among them. But these open ports can often serve as springboards to their

3

internal sensitive network segments. Consequently, the vulnerabilities in networks and the
alluring information contained in these networks plus the possible access to them make them
prone to cyber attacks. Meanwhile, due to the widespread and deep reliance of information
network, the potential devastating damage of computer attacks launched over the Internet has
been dramatically increasing during the past few years.

Figure 1 [CERT 2003] illustrates the number of vulnerabilities reported to CERT®1 [CERT/CC
2004] from 1995 to 2003. It is shown that the number of vulnerabilities reported to CERT has
grown rapidly from dozens at the early years to over four thousands in 2003.

Figure 1. The number of Vulnerabilities reported to CERT from 1995 to 2003

1

CERT® is a registered service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.
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Unsurprisingly, as a direct consequence of increasing vulnerabilities in computer networks,
cyber attacks have been soaring during the past decade, especially past three years. Figure 2
[CERT 2003] depicts the number of cyber incidents reported to CERT from 1995 to 2003. It can
be easily seen that the amount of accidents has been upsoaring sharply through the past several
years.

Figure 2. The number of incidents reported to CERT from 1995 to 2003

In response to the daunting threats of rapidly growing cyber attacks, a promising approach to
deterring intruders is to detect record and analyze attacks, and finally prosecute malicious
attackers using the evidence collected through the above process. Computer and network
forensics is such an approach and a new emerging discipline that is becoming more important as
the society is recognizing the seriousness of cyber attacks. It involves capturing, recording, and
analysis of network events in order to discover the source of security attacks or other problem
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incidents. It attempts to prevent hackers from attacking a system, and searches for evidence after
an attack has occurred.

Intrusion detection system (IDS) is an indispensable part of computer and network forensics. It is
deployed to monitor network and host activities including data flows and information accesses
etc. Its main purpose is to detect real-time, ongoing intrusions and alert system administrators so
that appropriate actions could be taken to stop the intrusions or discover the damages if the
attacks had already succeeded. Advanced intrusion-detection techniques are generally of two
types: anomaly detection and signature detection. Anomaly detection is based on models of
normal user behavior. These models are often established through statistical analysis of systemusage patterns. Deviations from normal system-usage patterns are flagged as suspicious.
Signature detection is based upon models of intruder behavior. Known intrusion methods are
characterized as signatures or rules. User activity that matches a signature or rule raises an alarm.

Problem context and main objective of this research

Although researchers are exploring many different mechanisms in intrusion detection to improve
its performance and their efforts have been quite successful during past few years, current
intrusion detection systems are still facing many common problems including alert flooding,
isolated alerts, high false positive and false negative rates, system integration problems and very
few security decision supports etc. More specifically, they tend to generate excessive alerts and
the overwhelming amount of alerts can easily overwhelm system administrators’ ability to
handle; they often emanate too many false positive alerts. That is to say, current intrusion
detection systems often generate a lot of alerts against normal behaviors; they also cannot catch
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many new or latest exploit patterns. This corresponds to false negatives; they are unaware the
network context they are operating so that alerts generated by them are often immune to the
targets. For instance, IDS can generate an alert with critical priority against an attack exploiting
an IIS (Internet Information Service) vulnerability even though the target is running an Apache
server. These alerts constitute false positive alerts; no detailed security decision support is
provided. At best, current intrusion detection system only provides a short description of
generated alerts. It is left to system administrators to search for the relevant information and
appropriate actions to be taken to thwart the attacks.

Some of these problems are so critical that they will determine the future success of intrusion
detection as a trustworthy investment. For instance, facing an overwhelming amount of intrusion
alerts with excessive false alerts among them, many security administrators simply choose to
ignore all of the alerts, even turn off the monitoring IDS completely. This will definitely shake
their trust in IDS products. The main goal for the proposed system, dubbed as TRINETR2, is to
provide a generic framework for IDS alert management and analysis to make intrusion detection
alerts more accurate, to facilitate a more efficient use of IDS and provide appropriate security
solutions corresponding to generated alerts to facilitate security decision making as well as
automate appropriate processes.

A novel collaborative architecture design is presented in TRINETR to integrate intrusion
detection from multiple intrusion detection systems. The architecture is composed of three core
2

TRINETR is derived from Tri Netra, which means three eyes. The implication is that the third

eye is the system we are developing to watch over a computer network.
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parts: Alert Aggregation, Knowledge-based Alert Evaluation and Security Decision Support, and
Alert Correlation. The architecture is aimed at reducing the alert overload by aggregating alerts
from multiple sensors to generate condensed views, reducing false positive alerts by integrating
network and host asset information into alert evaluation process, providing appropriate real-time
security solutions to facilitate decision making, and correlating events based on logical relations
among them to generate global and synthesized alert report.

The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: firstly, an overview of intrusion detection is
presented in chapter 2. Chapter 3 addresses the problem context and research motivations of this
dissertation research. The TRINETR architecture design is described in Chapter 4 and each of
the three key components is described in a separate following chapter. Implementation and
testing of a prototype system is presented in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 describes the related research
work in security information (INFOSEC) management and analysis area. Finally, conclusion and
future work is included in Chapter 10.
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Chapter 2

Intrusion Detection

Recognition of malicious attacks including probes preceding attacks, ongoing penetrations and
the damage caused by successful intrusions is an indispensable part of information network’s
security strategy. A successful detection of probes preceding attacks and ongoing attacks enables
system administrator to take appropriate counter measures to deter the malicious attacks.
Detection of intrusions can also help to minimize the damage caused by them. Furthermore,
detection of ongoing intrusion attacks or the damage caused by successful penetrations can save
valuable time and efforts in the subsequent recovery process.

2.1 The definition of intrusion and Intrusion Detection

Intrusion attempt or intrusion can be defined as the potential possibility of a deliberate
unauthorized attempt or action to access information, manipulate information or render a system
unreliable or unusable. Intrusion attempt or intrusion activity may be from external or internal.
Its ultimate purpose is to violate a system’s integrity, confidentiality and reliability.

Intruders are the human beings who carry out the intrusion events or attempts. Based on their
originality, intruders can be classified into two groups: external intruders and internal intruders.
External intruders do not have any authorized access to the system they attack. Internal intruders
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have some authority, but attempt to gain additional ability to take action without legitimate
authorization.

Intrusion detection involves recognizing that intruders has attempted to gain, or worse, has
gained unauthorized access to the protected system. Intrusion detection system (IDS) is the
hardware device or software system which is used in the intrusion detection process to monitor
network and host activities including data flows and information accesses etc. and detect
suspicious activities.

Intrusion detection systems (IDS) serve three essential security functions: they monitor, detect,
and respond to unauthorized activity by both internal intruders and external intruders. Intrusion
detection systems use policies to define certain events that, if detected will issue an alert. In other
words, if a particular event is considered to constitute a security incident, an alert will be issued
if that event is detected. Certain intrusion detection systems have the capability of sending out
alerts, so that the administrator of the IDS will receive a notification of a possible security
incident in the form of a page, email, or SNMP trap. Many intrusion detection systems not only
recognize a particular incident and issue an appropriate alert, they also respond automatically to
the event. Such a response might include logging off a user, disabling a user account, and
launching of scripts.

2.2 Principal Intrusion Detection Approaches
Currently there are two principal approaches to intrusion detection. The first approach is called
anomaly detection or behavior detection. Anomaly detection involves detecting any
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interesting/significant deviations from expected normal system behavior profile where the
normal system behavior profile is developed from a combination of background knowledge and
learning from known normal behaviors. It first relies on being able to define and develop normal
system behavior profile and then the ability to detect any significant deviations from normal
behavior. The boundary between normal and anomalous form of stored code and data is
precisely definable. One bit of difference may indicate a suspicious event. The boundary
between normal and anomalous behavior is much more difficult to define.

The second approach is misuse detection or signature detection. More commonly known as
signature detection, this approach uses specifically known patterns of unauthorized behavior to
detect subsequent similar attempts. These specific patterns are called signatures. The misuse
detection system monitors for those explicit patterns. The pattern may be a static bit string, for
example a specific virus bit string insertion. Alternatively, the pattern may describe a suspect set
of sequence of actions. Patterns take a variety of forms. The occurrence of a signature might not
signify an actual attempted unauthorized access (for example, it can be an honest mistake), but it
is a good idea to take each alert seriously. Depending on the robustness and seriousness of a
signature that is triggered, some alarm, response, or notification should be sent to the proper
authorities.

Intrusion detection systems have been built to explore both approaches – anomaly detection and
misuse detection – for the past 15 to 20 years. In some cases, the two detection approaches are
combined into a single system. But no fundamentally different alternative approach has been
introduced during past years. In the following sections, we shall describe each of these two
approaches.
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2.2.1 Anomaly Detection
Jones and Sielken [Jones and Sielken 2000] divide anomaly detection into two different types:
static and dynamic. A static anomaly detector is based on the assumption that there is a portion
of the system being monitored that should remain constant. Static anomaly detection checks for
data integrity. If the static portion of the system ever deviates from its original form, it indicates
that a suspicious event has occurred, and the suspicious event could be either an error or
deliberate tampering. Dynamic anomaly detection requires distinguishing between normal and
abnormal behavior. A system behavior is often defined as a sequence of system events, such as
audit records generated by operating system. Any deviation from the normal system behavior is
considered as abnormal or suspicious.

2.2.1.1 Static anomaly detection
Static anomaly detection uses one or several static bit strings to define the desired state of the
system. They archive a representation of that state, perhaps compressed. The static anomaly
detector then periodically compares the archived state representation to a similar representation
computed based on the current state of the same static bit strings. Any difference between the
two computed representations indicates an error such as hardware failure or intrusion.

One example of static anomaly detection is Tripwire. Tripwire™ [Kim and Spafford 1993] is a
file integrity assessment tool that was originally developed at Purdue University. Tripwire is
different from most other IDS products in that it detects changes in the file system of the
monitored system rather than looking for suspicious activities, per se.
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Tripwire computes checksums or cryptographic signatures of files. If these signatures are
computed for a file system that is known to be in a secure or safe configuration and stored in
such a way that they cannot be corrupted, for example, offline or on a write once medium, they
can be compared with a subsequent recomputation of signatures for the same file system to
determine which, if any files have changed. Tripwire can be configured to report all changes in
the monitored file system or only those of interest to the administrator. For example, it can check
if system binaries have been modified, if syslog files have shrunk, or if security settings have
unexpectedly changed. It can be configured to perform integrity checks at regularly scheduled
intervals and provides systems administrators with the information they need to implement
recovery if tampering has occurred.

Due to its detection mechanism, Tripwire will not detect an intrusion that does not modify files
or the detection will not be made until the next time the checksums are computed.

2.2.1.2 Dynamic anomaly detection

Dynamic anomaly detectors must define normal or correct system behavior. System behaviors
are often defined as a sequence (or partially ordered sequence) of distinct events. For instance,
many IDS use the audit records that are produced by the operating system to define the events of
interest. Events may occur in a strict sequence. More often, such as with distributed systems,
partial ordering of events is more appropriate. In still other cases, the order is not directly
represented; only cumulative information, such as cumulative ICMP packets received during a
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time interval, is recorded. In this case, thresholds are defined to separate nominal network
activity from anomalous network activity.

The dynamic anomaly intrusion detection system may rely on parameters that are set during
initialization or training process to reflect normal behavior. Initialization is measured and then
used to set parameters that describe correct or normal behavior. In the initialization process, a
base profile is created to characterize normal behavior. A profile consists of a set of observed
measures of behavior for each of a set of dimensions. Frequently used dimensions include
preferred choices, resources consumed, representative sequences of actions etc. Dynamic
anomaly detectors are similar to the static anomaly detectors in that they monitor behavior by
comparing current characterization of behavior to the initial characterization of expected
behavior(in the base profile). They seek any deviation from the base profile. Significant
deviations constitute abnormal behaviors. Typically, a clear boundary between normal and
abnormal is hard to define precisely. A biased definition of such a boundary could lead to high
false positive rates. For instance, if it is too loose, many intrusions could be missed. If it is
skewed to the other direction, many normal behaviors could be detected as abnormal. In this case,
the corresponding alerts are called false positive alerts.

The most common approach to draw the boundary between normal and abnormal behavior is
with statistical distributions having a mean and standard deviation. Once the distribution has
been established, a boundary can be drawn using some number of standard deviations. If an
observation lies at a point outside of the (parameterized) number of standard deviations, it is
reported as a possible intrusion.
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An example of dynamic anomaly detection is NIDES. The Next-generation Intrusion Detection
Expert System (NIDES) [Anderson et al. 1995 (a), (b), Javitz and Valdes 1993, Lunt 1993],
developed by SRI, contains a statistical dynamic anomaly detector. NIDES builds statistical
profiles of users, thought the entities monitored can also be workstations, network of
workstations, remote hosts, groups of users, or application programs. NIDES uses statistically
unusual behavior to detect an intruder masquerading as a legitimate user.

NIDES reads audit records written by the operating system. It defines a sequence of intervals or
“bins”; The “bin”s contain a count of the number of observations with values in the interval
represented by the “bin”. For instance, one profile dimension of a user includes a distribution of
the total memory size of the user’s processes during execution. At any point the user’s current
profile is the distribution of periodically sampled total memory size. The current and base
distributions can be compared for similarity.

To maintain each statistical profile dimension, NIDES stores only statistics such as frequencies,
means, variances, and covariances of the profile because storing the audit data itself is too bulky.
Given a profile with n measures, NIDES characterizes any point in the n-space of the measures
to be anomalous if it significantly deviates from an expected or defined value.

2.2.2 Signature Detection

Signature detection involves catching intruders who are attempting to break into or has already
broken into a system using known techniques. Ideally, network and system should be checked
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periodically and all the existing known vulnerabilities should be eliminated. However,
eliminating all known vulnerabilities may be too cost prohibitive or unduly constrains system
functionality. For instance, eliminating a certain vulnerability may involve patching all systems
in the protected network and rebooting them after that. It may be too effort and time consuming
to do so. In practice, a lot of administrators do not remove numerous vulnerabilities even when
they exist. So signature based detection is needed in case these vulnerabilities are being exploited
through known ways. Signature detection looks for know intrusion techniques stored on its
knowledge base, irrespective of the user’s normal behavior.

A signature detection system typically continually compares current system activity to a set of
intrusion scenarios in an attempt to detect a scenario in progress. Known intrusion methods are
described as signatures. Depended on how the signatures are modeled, signature based detection
can be classified as rule based or state based. Rule based detection systems use rules to define
what are the known intrusion methods or bad behavior. Large numbers of rules accumulated and
proved to be difficult to interpret and modify because they were not necessarily grouped by
intrusion scenario.

To overcome these difficulties, scenario representations are introduced in so called state based
signature detection. These include model-based rule organizations and state transition
representations. These have proved to be more intuitive for the signature detection system users,
since in the rule-based detection system the rules will need to be constantly maintained and
updated to cope with newly discovered intrusion scenarios, ease of use is a major concern.
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2.2.2.1 Rule-based Signature Detection
Rule-based signature detection catches intrusions by encoding known intrusion scenarios or
techniques as a set of rules. These rules reflect the partially ordered sequence of actions that
comprise the intrusion scenarios. Some rules may be applicable to more than one intrusion
scenario.

The system state is represented in a knowledge base consisting of a fact base and a rule base. A
fact base is collection of assertions that can be made based on accumulated data from that the
audit records or directly from system activity monitoring. The rule base contains the rules that
describe known intrusion scenarios or generic techniques. When a pattern of a rule’s antecedent
matches the asserted fact, a rule-fact binding is created. The rule then fires. It may cause an alert
to be raised for a system administrator. Alternatively, some automated response, such as
terminating that user’s session, will be taken.

An example of rule-based intrusion detection system is IDES. Initially, IDES [Lunt et al. 1989]
was designed with a simple rule-based system to detect intrusion attempts using intrusion
scenarios described by rule sets. The rule-based component was based on the same ProductionBased Expert System Toolset (P-BEST) that MIDAS used. The rule base was divided into two
parts for easier maintainability and understanding. The generic rules are those that can be applied
to many different types of target systems under a number of configurations. The second part of
the rules are those that are either operating system or implementation dependent. IDES was a
predecessor of NIDES.
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Other rule-based IDS included MIDAS[MIDAS 2004], Snort[Snort 2004], Prelude[Prelude
2004], Bro[Bro 2004] etc.

2.2.2.2 State-based signature detection

In state-based signature detection mechanism, attribute-value pairs characterize system states of
interest. Actions that contribute to intrusion scenarios are defined as transitions between states.
Each action changes the value of attribute(s) of interest. Intrusion scenarios are defined in the
form of state transition diagrams. Nodes represent system states and arcs represent relevant
actions. The action causes a transition between states and determines how the attribute values of
the prior state change as a result of a transition.

Figure 3. Generic State Transition Diagram

The state of the system is a function of all the users, processes, and data present in a system at
any given point. A state transition diagram that defines an intrusion scenario consists of an initial
state, the state before the intrusion, and a compromised state, the state after the intrusion has
been completed. In between are some number of transition states. These states are illustrated in
Figure 3. Actions of interest are those taken by the would-be intruder to attain the compromised
state. Actions that do not involve a labeled arc emanating from a current state (initial or

18

transition) are ignored for the purposes of a specific intrusion scenario. If a compromised (final)
state is ever reached, an intrusion is said to have occurred.

An example of state-based signature detection system is USTAT [ Ilgun 1993]. This state-based
approach uses an inference engine table to track each possible intrusion, and allows USTAT to
identify a coordinated attack emanating from multiple sources. It can do this since attack
sequences are defined, not by who is perpetrating the attack but by states of the system. Thus, if
two attackers are relying on the same composite state of the system, each of their subsequent
actions can be followed through a fork in the previous state transition sequence. This forking is
implemented by duplicating rows in the inference engine table, each row representing different
attack sequences.

The initial implementation of USTAT was a host-based, UNIX-based system.

2.2.2.3 Summary of the two principal approaches

The early research uncover several features of the two principal approaches, anomaly and
signature detection. The advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches can be summarized
as follows:

Anomaly Detection
Advantage: The operator needs not configure the system, it automatically learns the
behavior of a large number of subjects, and can be left to run unattended. Since it
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contains no knowledge, some would say prejudice, about how an intrusion would
manifest itself, it has the possibility of catching novel intrusions, as well as variations of
known intrusion techniques.

Disadvantage: By definition, it only flags unusual behavior, not necessarily illicit
behavior per se. This can be a problem when two types of behavior do not overlap. A
system that learns to accept dangerous behavior as “normal” for a particular user, who
slowly changes his behavior over time, will not find anything out of the ordinary when
that user finally mounts his attack. The updating of the subject’s profiles, and the
correlation of current behavior with those profiles is typically a computational intensive
task, that can tax the available computing resources hard.

Signature Detection
Advantages: The system “knows” for a fact, either suspect behavior, or how normal
behavior should manifest itself. This leads to simple and efficient processing of the audit
data. The rate of false positives (benign activity classified as an intrusion) can also be
kept low.

Disadvantages: Specifying the detection signatures is a highly qualified, and time
consuming task. It is not something that “ordinary” operators of the system would do.
Depending on how these signatures are specified, subtle variations of the intrusion
scenarios can lead to them going undetected. Of course, the method has limited predictive

20

powers. It cannot detect intrusions that are novel to it, especially not those of a
fundamentally new class of intrusions.

Since each approach has its own intrinsic problems and advantages, a hybrid approach easily
comes into sight. It is hoped that by combining these two approaches into a hybrid approach, the
best of both techniques could be obtained.

2.3 Types of Intrusion Detection System.
There are two basic types of intrusion detection based on the range of its detection: host-based
and network-based. Each has a distinct approach to monitoring and securing data, and each has
distinct advantages and disadvantages. In short, host-based IDSs examine data held on individual
computers that serve as hosts, while network-based IDSs examine data exchanged between
computers.

2.3.1 Host-Based IDS (HIDS)
Host-based systems were the first type of IDS to be developed and implemented. These systems
collect and analyze data that originate on a computer that hosts a service, such as a Web server.
Once this data is aggregated for a given computer, it can either be analyzed locally or sent to a
separate/central analysis machine. One example of a host-based system is a program that
operates on a system and receives application or operating system audit logs. These programs are
highly effective for detecting insider abuses. Residing on the trusted network systems themselves,
they are close to the network’s authenticated users. If one of these users attempts unauthorized
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activity, host-based systems usually detect and collect the most pertinent information in the
quickest possible manner. In addition to detecting unauthorized insider activity, host-based
systems are also effective at detecting unauthorized file modification.

On the down side, host-based systems can get unwieldy. With several thousand possible
endpoints on a large network, collecting and aggregating separate specific computer information
for each individual machine may prove inefficient and ineffective. In addition, if an intruder
disables the data collection on any given computer, the IDS on that machine will be rendered
useless because there is no backup.

Possible host-based IDS implementations include Windows NT/2000 Security Event Logs,
RDMS audit sources, Enterprise Management systems audit data (such as Tivoli), and UNIX
Syslog in their raw forms or in their secure forms such as Solaris' BSM; host-based commercial
products include RealSecure [ISS 2004], ITA[Symantec 2004], Dragon Squire [Dragon 2004],
and Entercept [Entercept 2004], to name a few.

2.3.2 Network-Based IDS (NIDS)
As opposed to monitoring the activities that take place on a particular host, network-based
intrusion detection analyzes data packets that travel over the actual network. These packets are
examined and sometimes compared with empirical data to verify their nature: malicious or
benign. Because they are responsible for monitoring a network, rather than a single host,
network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) tend to be more distributed than host-based
IDS. In addition, the surveillance of the network connections between computers makes
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network-based IDS great at detecting access attempts from outside the trusted network. In
general, network-based systems are best at detecting the following activities:
•

Unauthorized outsider access: When an unauthorized user logs in successfully, or
attempts to log in, they are best tracked by host-based IDS. However, detecting the
unauthorized users before their log on attempt is best accomplished with network-based
IDS.

•

Bandwidth theft/denial of service: These attacks from outside the network single out
network resources for abuse or overload. The packets that initiate/carry these attacks can
best be noticed with use of network-based IDS.

Some possible downsides to network-based IDS include encrypted packet payloads and highspeed networks, both of which inhibit the effectiveness of packet interception and deter packet
interpretation.

Examples of network-based IDS include Shadow [Shadow 2004], Snort [Snort 2004], NFR
[NFR 2004], RealSecure [ISS 2004], and NetProwler [NetProwler 2004].

2.3.3 Hybrid: HIDS and NIDS Used in Combination
The two types of intrusion detection systems differ significantly from each other, but
complement one another well. The network architecture of host-based is agent-based, which
means that a software agent resides on each of the hosts that will be governed by the system. In
addition, more efficient host-based intrusion detection systems are capable of monitoring and
collecting system audit trails in real time as well as on a scheduled basis, thus distributing both
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CPU utilization and network overhead and providing for a flexible means of security
administration.

In a proper IDS implementation, it would be advantageous to fully integrate the network
intrusion detection system, such that it would filter alerts and notifications in an identical manner
to the host-based portion of the system, controlled from the same central location. In doing so,
this provides a convenient means of managing and reacting to misuse using both types of
intrusion detection.

That said, as an organization introduces an IDS into its network to augment its current
information security strategy, the primary focus of the intrusion detection system should be hostbased. Although network intrusion detection has its merits and certainly must be incorporated
into a proper IDS solution, it has historically been incapable of evolving to comply with the
growing technology of data communications. Most NIDS perform miserably, if at all, on
switched networks, fast networks of speeds over 100 Mbps, and encrypted networks.
Furthermore, somewhere in the range of 80 - 85 percent of security incidents originate from
within an organization. Consequently, intrusion detection systems should rely predominantly on
host-based components, but should always make use of NIDS to complete the defense. In short, a
truly secure environment requires both a network and host-based intrusion detection
implementation to provide for a robust system that is the basis for all of the monitoring, response,
and detection of computer misuse.
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Chapter 3

Problem Context and Research

Motivation
Around twenty years of research have produced many successful intrusion detection systems. As
described in the previous chapter, they are based on two fundamental approaches: the detection
of anomalous behavior as it deviates from normal behavior, and the signature detection looking
for known intrusion methods. These two approaches were originally developed for single
operating systems. After that, they were extended and scaled to address distributed systems. Due
to the threats from the rapidly growing number of cyber attacks, in recent years, intrusion
detection has begun to gain wide acceptance in enterprises as a necessary and worthwhile
investment in security.

3.1 Common problems challenging current intrusion
detection systems.
Despite its recent success, current intrusion detection system is still presenting many weaknesses.
Some of these weaknesses are so critical that they may snag its further widespread acceptance.
Some of the common problems include the followings [Yu 2004(b)]:
1. Alert Flooding. IDS systems are prone to alert flooding. System administrators can
easily be overwhelmed by the vast amount of log information and alerts especially false
positive alerts produced by them. In reality, a moderate size information network can
contain dozens to hundreds of publicly accessible servers providing web service, ftp, and
database storage etc. In such a network, a group of IDS products often are deployed to
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monitor network information flow and data access. These products may come from
different vendors that employ different detection mechanisms or different signature sets.
In such a network, daily information flow can grow up to gigabytes, and the IDS products
often generate tens of hundreds or even thousands of alerts every day. This overwhelming
volume of alerts apparently drowns out the security administrators. Furthermore, the
overwhelming amount of alerts generated by IDS products often do not indicate that
protected network or system are under heavily enemy fire but due to a huge amount of
duplicates and false positive alerts.

2. Too Many False Positives. Due to the quality of current detection signatures and the
difficulty to define precisely the boundary between normal and abnormal behaviors, both
signature-based and anomaly detection tend to generate too many false positive alerts, i.e.,
they generate excessive alerts upon normal network and hosts behavior. Consequently,
real malicious and important alerts will be buried among tons of false alarms. System
administrator’s attention will also be diverted by these false alerts so that real threatening
attacks can be ignored.

3. Lack of Context Awareness. Current IDS products are often unaware of the network
and host system context they are monitoring. For instance, an IDS system does not know
whether the critical host it is monitoring is running Windows operating system or UNIX
operating system. IDS systems tend to generate too general alerts and are not fully
integrated into the system they are monitoring. IDS alerts are isolated from the protected
system configuration. Consequently, current IDS systems cannot distinguish real harmful
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attacks from those unable to succeed probes. For instance, a Snort IDS can generate an
alert with the highest priority against an attack which is attempting to exploit a
vulnerability in IIS 4.0 web server even though the target is running an Apache server. In
this case, although the attack attempt is guaranteed not to succeed, it is still rated as a
critical attack by the blind IDS. If a huge amount of alerts are these kinds of system
immune or false positive alerts, real malicious attacks with high likelihood to succeed
will be buried underneath. One common solution to this weakness is alert filter and
signature tuning. But alert filtering and signature tuning will require the system security
operators to understand the IDS signatures thoroughly. Filters are also difficult to
maintain. For instance, different filters will be needed for different IDS products since
each IDS system has its unique signature sets.

4. Lack of Decision Support. Since IDS products are not fully integrated into the network
and system security environment they are monitoring, alerts generated by them cannot
provide decision support against security threats. At best, they only provide a short
description of the generated alert. No appropriate security solutions or suggestions
corresponding to the alerts emanated are provided. It is left to the expertise and
experience of the system administrators to find out security solutions.

5. High False Negative Rates. The performance of signature based intrusion detection
system depends on the exhaustiveness of its signature base. New intrusion methods have
been emerging rapidly as well as new vulnerabilities found in contemporary networks. If
signature base is not updated in time to include these latest exploits, signature intrusion
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detection system would miss those attacks exploiting latest vulnerabilities and intrusion
methods. Besides, the same intrusion attack may have different implementations or
different carry-out sequences. These slightly modified attack methods may deceive dumb
intrusion detection system looking for fixed, explicit patterns. As to anomaly based
intrusion detection systems, the difficulty to define precisely the boundary could not only
generate a huge amount of false positive alerts, but also miss many real malicious attacks.
A static predetermined thresh-hold value could be severely skewed. Training data set
could contain contaminated data which include anomaly behavior. Consequently,
“normal” behavior observation based on contaminated data set could contain abnormal
activity. Anomaly detection system working with such polluted normal definition could
easily let it go many real exploits.

Besides the above common challenges facing all intrusion detection systems, they also have
intrinsic inefficiency due to the detection mechanisms they implement. For instance, anomaly
based intrusion detection system tends to generate more false positives than signature based
intrusion detection systems. This is because deviation from normal behavior does not always
correspond to the occurrence of an attack. Moreover, intelligent attackers can slowly modify his
behavior so that the final behavior includes an attack. The IDS will be trained to learn and accept
this slowly deviated behavior and associate it with a normal behavior. Therefore, the attack will
not be detected. This corresponds to the occurrence of a false negative.

Signature based IDS products are facing other kinds of problems. The problem of exhaustively
defining the attack base is a major difficulty of misuse detection. Therefore, signature based
detection can miss many real attacks when its attack signature base is not exhaustive or updated
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timely to include the latest intrusion methods. Meanwhile, a given attack may have many close
but different implementations, capturing all of the variation of the same attack could be a very
difficult task if it is feasible at all. Moreover, in current products, the quality of signatures
expressed in the attack base is generally not sufficient to avoid false positives. That is to say,
many false positive alarms could be generated due to the low quality of signature base.

Due to the limitation intrinsic to their design mechanisms, each of the two types of intrusion
detection system has its own detection “blind” spot. For instance, network intrusion detection
system functions by monitoring datagram packets passing through the whole network. It could
catch suspicious packets and emanate alerts to system administrators. But it is unaware what is
happening in the target host. It is difficult for them to verify the consequence of the malicious
attacks or validate of suspicious activity. Host based intrusion detection system knows what’s
really going on inside the host and the system state. But it doesn’t know what is going on in the
network. Therefore, it is a challenging task for them to find correlated attacks.

3.2 The motivation for the research.
To overcome each individual intrusion detection method’s weaknesses, a promising approach is
to develop a cooperation module between several intrusion detection systems to analyze alerts
and generate more global and synthetic alerts. The objective is to reduce the overwhelming
amount of alerts and minimize each intrusion detection system’s blind spot by collaboration
among them.

To reduce false alerts especially false positive alerts, one common mechanism used in practice is
to reconfigure and customize misuse detection’s signature set based on the protected network
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and host asset information. But manual signature reconfiguration could be a daunting process. In
addition, network and host asset are dynamic. This dynamic change requires system
administrator to reconfigure signature sets timely. In practice, an enterprise network may have
multiple subsets with different security policy. Tailoring signature sets to suit different subnets as
well as manually maintaining them could impose a huge burden on system administrator.
Therefore, automated alert evaluation is needed to relieve system administrator from the above
pressure. Automated alert evaluation could also reflect network and host information asset’s
dynamic topology, system environment, security policy etc. in real time. Evaluated alerts contain
information more accurate to protected entities and are subsequently more valuable.

As described in the common problems, alerts generated by current IDS products are isolated. But
intelligent intruders often carry out a series of steps to achieve their final objectives. Traditional
intrusion detection systems focus on low-level attacks or anomalies; they cannot capture the
logical steps or attacking strategies behind these attacks. Alerts are emanated independently. In
situations where there are intensive intrusions, not only will real alerts be mixed with false alerts,
but the logical connections among related attacked will also be buried underneath. As a result, it
is difficult for human users or intrusion response systems to understand the real attack strategies
behind the alerts and take appropriate actions. To solve this problem and facilitate decision
making, the analysis of intrusion alerts, especially alert correlation is needed. A perfect alert
correlation should be able to thread related alerts and find the logical relation among them.
Therefore the series of attack steps plotted by intruders could be found. By discovering relations
among attack steps, we can even predict the occurrence of attacks by finding its preceding steps.
Consequently, in this battle with intelligent attacks, more time could be gained by finding real
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attacks earlier and appropriate response mechanisms could be taken to deter the occurrence of
malicious attacks and minimize damage caused by them.

At Concurrent Engineering Research Center (CERC) [CERC 2004] of West Virginia University,
this dissertation research project, dubbed as TRINETR, has been developed, with intelligent
agents and knowledge-based alert evaluation to rank the priority of alerts according to network
and system topology, environment and other relevant information, facilitate security decision
support upon the occurrence of real time intrusion. In this work, a novel generic architecture is
developed to manage, analyze, deal with alerts and cooperate multiple IDS products. The core of
this architecture is a framework that incorporates dynamic network and host assets information
and common known vulnerability knowledge into the alert evaluation process. With the
knowledge information asset, every piece of useful information will be stored in a centralized
place. The evaluation task is also performed in this centralized process. No alert filtering,
signature tuning and corresponding administration overhead are needed. This framework can not
only be used to provide alert prioritization but also to provide real time security solution
suggestion for decision support for each generated alert.

In this work, we categorize the correlation into two different types: (a) information asset
correlation and (b) the alert correlation. Information asset correlation uses the network, host,
hardware and software information to evaluate the alert priority and the likelihood of the success
of the attack; the alert correlation is to correlate different alerts based on the logical relations
among them to provide a global vision of the effects of intrusion.

The motivation for this dissertation work is driven by an effort to address many of the above
described problems. The motivation is to propose an architecture design and develop a prototype
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system to facilitate a more efficient use and management of intrusion detection systems as well
as provide appropriate security solution suggestions to facilitate security decision making.

3.3 Primary objectives of the research.
The main objectives of this research include the following:

1. To provide a generic framework for IDS alert management and analysis.
2. To reduce the overwhelming amount of alerts.
3. To make intrusion detection alerts more accurate by reducing false positive alerts. This is
done through incorporating dynamic network and host asset information including
topology, configuration, system environments etc into the evaluation process.
4. To facilitate the use IDS and provide appropriate security solution corresponding to
generated alerts to facilitate system administration as well as automate appropriate
processes.
5. To study the correlation among detected alerts to find logical relations among attacks.

Other objectives include studying the aggregation and correlation among different intrusion
detection system alerts, bringing intelligent expert system into the evaluation process, designing
a web interface for managing and viewing alert information etc.

In the following chapter, the architecture design of TRINETER will be described. The
architecture consists of three key components: Alert Aggregation, Knowledge-based Alert
Evaluation and Security Decision Support, and Alert Correlation.
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Chapter 4

TRINETR Architecture Design

The TRINETR architecture (Figure 4) consists of three main components: (1) Alert Aggregator,
(2) Knowledge-based Alert Evaluation and Security Decision Support Component, and (3) Alert
Correlator. Each of these three key components will be described in details in the following
sections.

4.1 Alert Aggregator

Alert Aggregation is the process of collecting alerts from different IDS products, converting
them into a standard format and clustering them based on defined similarities. Aggregated alerts
will then be stored in a relational database for later analysis. Aggregation is the first component
of the alert management and analysis system and it is also an important component. By
appropriate aggregation process, the amount of alerts will be significantly reduced. Scattered,
random alerts will be aggregated into related alert groups to be further analyzed by other
components.

The aggregation component provides three functions: (i) alert preprocessing, (ii) alert clustering
and (iii) alert merging. To collaborate alerts from multiple IDS products with different output
formats, first the component needs to convert the diversified outputs into a unified standard
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Figure 4. TRINETR Architecture Design

format. The format we chose is the Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF)
[IDMEF 2004]. An overview of IDMEF format and sample alerts recorded in this format can be
found in Appendix A. Standardized alerts are stored in a relational database for later analysis;
Alert clustering groups alerts into different clusters according to their source, target, time and
attack classification. Each cluster will then have a "representative alert" or a meta alert to
represent that cluster. Clustering is used to eliminate duplicate alerts and group alerts generated
from the occurrence of the same attack. Clusters are then used in alert merging process; Alert
merging process is used to merge the alerts from different IDS products into synthesized alerts.
Alert merging process uses a voting algorithm when conflicts appear. The algorithm is
straightforward. Each of the IDS products is assigned a trusted weight t i according to their past
performance. The sum of these weights equals to 1. If the sum of those active IDS weights is
greater than certain pre-specified value when an attack occurs, the voting algorithm will notify
that an attack has occurred and generate a synthetic alert. But when only two IDS are deployed,
we chose a priority based voting algorithm. When conflict arises, the algorithm will generate a
synthesized alert only when the priority levels of the generated alert pass the associated priority

34

screening levels. The priority of the synthesized alert will still be lowered one level compared to
its original one.

After alert aggregation process, clean and synthesized alerts containing the detailed information
from all of the active IDS systems are sent to the knowledge-based evaluation component for
further analysis. This alert aggregation component will be elaborated in Chapter 5.

4.2 Alert Evaluation and Security Decision Support
Component

Current IDS systems are often unaware of the system environment in which they are running.
IDS systems only serve as add-on security alarms, which are often not fully integrated into the
system itself. This isolation between the IDS products and the system security environment
results in a high rate of false positives. The IDS systems are also prone to generate alerts to
which systems are immune. For instance, an IDS system can send a high severity alert in
response to an attack that is exploiting a well-known vulnerability of a Windows 2000 operating
system even though the system that the IDS is monitoring is a Linux operating system. System
security operators will be distracted by these impossible-to-succeed attacks or low priority
probes. High volume of false positive alerts will make the system security operator miss the real
malicious attacks that are more likely to succeed.
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Besides the above problem, current IDS products also do not provide appropriate security
solution suggestions to facilitate security decision making. At best, only a short description of the
emanated alerts is provided to system administrators. It is left to system administrators’ expertise
to make the security decisions. It could impose a heavy burden on their daily routine. In addition,
if the security solution could not be found in time, the best time to thwart the attacks and
minimize the damage could be missed.

This alert evaluation and security decision support component is targeted to address the above
problems. This component evaluates alerts against network and host assets using knowledge
about known vulnerability requirement of the attack and targets’ configuration and system
information. Priority is assigned to every alert. System immune alerts and false positive alerts
will be either eliminated or marked as lower priority alerts. Security solutions to higher priority,
real harmful alerts will be generated using known security solutions coupled with security policy
and contingency plans. The suggested security solution can be used to facilitate security
decisions as well as automate contingency responses. This component will be described in details
in Chapter 6.

4.3 Alert Correlator
The main purpose of this component is to find logical relationships among the alerts. Intelligent
attackers are likely to launch a series of attacks against their targets. Traditional IDS systems can
only generate isolated alerts based on each attack it detects. Intelligent hackers are more likely to
disguise their real purposes by launching many other minor attacks. Alert correlation component
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is used to correlate alerts based on logical relationships among the alerts. This component will
provide the system security operator with great insight into where the initial attacks come from
and where they actually end up. This component can also be used to find patterns among series
of attacks. After the alert correlation, a high-level report providing an overall view of the attacks
will be presented to the system security operators.

The alert correlation component could provide other functionalities. For instance, by appropriate
correlation of the alerts from different IDS systems, we may be able to verify the occurrence of a
certain attack. For instance, a network-based IDS detects a suspicious remote buffer-overflow
attack to get shell access to a server machine. But due to its limitation, it does not know what is
really going on inside that host after that. Meanwhile, a host-based IDS system deployed inside
that server detects a suspicious shell process and generates an alert. Therefore by correlating
these alerts from the above two different IDS products, the system security operator can further
confirm that some remote shell access attack is in progress. Furthermore, since each IDS product
has its own “blind” spots, a correlation can help to remove some of the false negatives. Alert
correlation will be described in details in Chapter 7.

Finally, after alerts being processed by the three key components, alert reports containing both
synthetic alerts providing an overall picture of once isolated alerts and the security solutions
based on the predefined enterprise security and contingency plan will be generated. Alert
statistical information based on the attack source, target, exploited vulnerabilities, attack
classification and other useful statistics will also be calculated or surveyed and provided in
graphical forms.
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Chapter 5

Alert Aggregation

Realizing the intrinsic limitations or “blind” spots of each individual intrusion detection
approaches, system administrators often deploy multiple intrusion detection systems detecting
with different mechanisms. It is hoped that by collaboration of multiple intrusion detection
systems, we shall be able to overcome each single approach’s weaknesses. But this raises many
other problems. The first and most obvious problem is: different intrusion detection may have
different alert formats. Analyzing a large amount of heterogeneous alert outputs could impose a
huge burden on system administrators. To relieve system administrators from the above burden
and to cooperate detection from multiple IDS products, alerts in heterogeneous formats must be
standardized. This functionality is provided by TRINETR’s first component: Alert Aggregation.

Alert Aggregation is the process of collecting alerts from different IDS products, converting
them into a standard format and clustering them based on defined similarities. Aggregated alerts
will then be stored in a relational database for later analysis. Aggregation is the first component
of the TRINETR system and it is also a critical component. By appropriate aggregation process,
the amount of alerts will be significantly reduced. Scattered, random alerts will be aggregated
into related alert groups to be further analyzed by other components.
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5.1 Database Schema Generation

To aggregate alerts from different IDS products, we need to convert them into a standard format.
The format we use is the Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF). The Intrusion
Detection Message Exchange Format [IDMEF 2004] is intended to be a standard data format that
automated intrusion detection systems can use to report alerts about events that they deem
suspicious. The goals and requirements of the IDMEF are described in “Intrusion Detection
Message Exchange Requirements” [IDMEF 2004]. This Internet-Draft describes a proposed
implementation of the data format component of the IDMEF, using the Extensible Markup
Language (XML) to represent the class hierarchy. In the draft, the rationale for choosing XML is
explained and a Document Type Definition (DTD) is developed. An earlier version of this
implementation was reviewed, along with other proposed implementations, by the IDWG at its
September, 1999 and February, 2000 meetings. At the February meeting, it was decided that the
XML solution was best at fulfilling the IDWG requirements. An overview of IDMEF and sample
alerts in IDMEF is included in Appendix A.

The development of this standard format will enable interoperability among the commercial,
open source, and the research systems, allowing the users to mix-and-match the deployment of
these systems according to their strong and weak points to obtain an optimal implementation.

The most obvious place to implement the IDMEF is in the data channel between an intrusion
detection analyzer and the manager to which it sends alarms. The IDMEF data model is an
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object-oriented representation of the alert data sent to intrusion managers by intrusion detection
analyzers.

The data model addresses several problems associated with representing the intrusion detection
alert data:

•

Alert information is inherently heterogeneous.

•

Intrusion detection environments are different.

•

Analyzer capabilities are different.

•

Operating environments are different.

•

Commercial vendor objectives are different.

The top-level class for all IDMEF messages is IDMEF-Message; each type of message is a
subclass of this top-level class. Currently, two types of messages are defined: Alerts and
Heartbeats. Within each message, subclasses of the message class are used to provide the
detailed information carried in the message.

During this alert aggregation process, heterogeneous alerts are converted into standard IDMEF
format and then stored into a database. According to the above IDMEF data model, we generate
one relation for each class and one relation for each of its subclasses in the IDMEF database. The
transformation process generates 30 relations totally. For each alert, a unique identification
number is generated. The alert identification number also serves as the foreign keys to cross link
the related classes. In addition to the 30 relations, a special aggregation relation table is also
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generated. The relation table contains the condensed alert information. It is used as cache in the
aggregation process.

For each sensor, an agent is deployed to transform alerts generated by the sensor into the IDMEF
format and store the alert information into IDMEF classes and subclasses. The agents are
running simultaneously with the deployed sensors. But since many of the available IDS products
are not fully compatible with IDMEF, some of the relation tables in the database schema will
remain empty. We generate all of the relations for the sake of completeness and in the hope that
in the future IDS vendors will provide fully IDMEF compatible products as IDMEF is becoming
an industry standard.

5.2 Alerts clustering

The function of alert clustering is to identify and cluster the alerts that match the same attack
occurrence. One purpose of this function is to reduce duplicates and generate Meta alerts.
Current IDS products are prone to generate many duplicated or very similar alerts corresponding
to the occurrence of same attack. After clustering, each alert cluster will generate one
representative of that IDS system's “voice”, and the representative alert will be used in the voting
algorithm in the merging process. We cluster alerts sent by different IDS separately is because
different IDS vendors classify intrusion attacks into different categories. It is easier to cluster the
alerts generated by the same IDS system since the classifications are the same. We leave the
classification clustering and merging to the alert merging process.
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Alert clustering is based on the similarities among different alerts. When an alert is sent to the
aggregation component, there are two possibilities: (1) if no similar aggregation exists, a new
aggregation will be generated containing the new alert; or (2) this alert can be aggregated into an
existing aggregation and the alert aggregation will be updated to contain this new alert
information.

Alert clustering will be based on the structural similarities of the four items: source, target, time
and classification. In the IDMEF format, the structures of the source and the target are similar.
Different IDS may report source and target information using different formats. For instance, a
network-based IDS generally describes the source and the target by the IP address and the port
numbers. A host-based IDS may describe them by the host name, process name or number.
Therefore a source and target transform function should be implemented to overcome the
discrepancies. During the clustering process the transform function will not be needed since the
alerts will only be clustered with the alerts from the same IDS system, and the same IDS system
has a consistent way to describe alerts. However, it will be used in the merging process (we will
discuss this in the following section). Source and the target similarity will also determine
whether two alerts will be aggregated or not. In our current implementation, only the alerts
having the same source and the target are considered similar. In the future implementation, we
will attempt to expand the source similarity to include alerts from the same subnets.

In IDMEF, there are three classes for describing time: (1) analyzertime, (2) createtime and (3)
detecttime. Analyzertime is the time when an alert is generated by the cooperation system.
Createtime is the time when the alert is detected. Detecttime is the time when the attack occurs.
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In our opinion, among these three timestamps the detecttime is the most appropriate timestamp
to aggregate the alerts. The other two: anaylzertime and createtime do not directly correspond to
the occurrence of attacks: they are more related to the sensor properties. Each alert cluster can
only span several seconds. In our current implementation, we use 5 seconds as the limit. In this
case, same continuous attacks may trigger many clusters. We will use the alert correlation
process to provide an overall view of a series of activities from the same attack activity.

After clustering, the alerts will be grouped into different clusters according to different IDSs.
Each cluster will have a synthesized representative of it, which will be used in the alert merging
process.

5.3 Alert Merging

The alert merging process is used to merge alert clusters generated by different IDS products into
synthesized alert aggregations.

Alert merging will be based on the combination of four criteria: source, target, classification and
time. Different IDS may have different classification scheme. A common classification scheme
shall be used to unify the heterogeneous schemes. In our implementation, we use Snort’s
classification as the standard classifications. Other IDS’s classification shall be converted into
this classification. The other classifications are also included in the alert descriptions to provide
more information to system administrator.
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As described in the previous section, a source and target transform function will be needed if the
deployed IDS products describe them using different formats.

While aggregating the alerts using detecttime, we noticed that different IDSs may have a slight
time discrepancy. One sensor may be more sensitive or its detection algorithms may run faster
than another one. This will cause the first one to generate alerts before the other one. Sometimes
the time delay can be seconds. Therefore we allow a two-second variance while merging alerts
from different IDS products.

A voting algorithm will be needed when conflict arises during the merging of the alerts. When
the first IDS system generates an alert but second and third IDS systems do not, we need an
algorithm to resolve the conflict. When more than two IDS systems are deployed, we can use the
following formula:

According to each IDS product’s past performance, we assign a trust weight to each IDS
deployed in the system. The trusted weight could also be obtained from intrusion detection
evaluation efforts, for instance, the MIT Lincoln alert evaluation project [MIT Lincoln 2004].
Let t i be the trust weight of the ith IDS where 0< t i <1 and

∑t

i

= 1 . Let α i = 0 when the ith IDS

doesn’t generate an alert and α i = 1 where it does.

Let α = ∑ α i t i only when α ≥ β , where β is a pre-specified critical value, the voting algorithm
claims that a real attack is going on at that point.
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The principle of this formula is straightforward. If the sum of trusted weights of active IDS
systems is greater than a pre-specified critical value when an attack occurs, the voting algorithm
will tell that an attack has occurred and generate a synthetic alert.

But in reality, only very few companies deploy more than two heterogeneous IDS products to
monitor the same sector of network. In this case, when only two IDS products are deployed (as
in our own implementation and in MIRADOR [Cuppens 2001, Cuppens and Miege 2002]), the
above formula will not work. The above formula is always in favor of an IDS with higher weight
when conflicts arise. It is then difficult to make the decision whether something bad is really
happening.

Instead, we choose a conservative priority based voting algorithm to solve the conflicts when
only two IDS products are installed. According to the performance or reputation of the two IDS
systems, we assign different trust levels to them. The associated trust levels will then be assigned
different priority screening levels. When conflict arises, the algorithm will generate a synthesized
alert only when the priority levels of the emitted alert pass the associated priority screening
levels. The priority of the synthesized alert will still be lowered one level compared to its
original one. For instance, if an IDS with higher trust level generates an alert with “medium”
priority and its priority screening level is “low”, the voting algorithm will generate a synthesized
alert from the above alert but the priority in this new alert will be lowered to “low'”. In contrast,
if a sensor with lower trust level generates an alert with “medium” priority, and its priority
screening level is “medium'” the voting algorithm will simply discard this alert.
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After alert preprocessing, clustering and merging, alert overload can be significant reduced:
Heterogeneous alerts are converted into the standard IDMEF format; scattered alerts are
aggregated into different clusters based on similarities including source, target, classification and
time; alert conflicts are solved by voting algorithm in the merging process. After all, a Meta
alert is generated on behalf of each cluster. Meta alerts are sent to the next component:
knowledge-based alert evaluation and security decision support, to be further analyzed.
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Chapter 6

Knowledge-Based Alert Evaluation and

Security Decision Support

The core of TRINETR architecture is this knowledge-based alert evaluation and security
decision support framework. This framework provides two main functionalities: (1) evaluate
alerts against network and hosts asset information including network topology, host
configuration, system environment etc. using known vulnerability requirement of the attacks, (2)
provide appropriate security solution suggestions based on target’s current topology,
configuration and system information to provide security decision support. This functionality can
be further extended to provide automated intrusion response mechanisms. Figure 5 illustrates the
architecture of this framework with a typical usage scenario.

In our current implementation, we only focus on Windows and Unix-like OS including Unix,
Linux, BSD etc. Since Unix-like OS sometimes collectively known as *nix, in the rest of this
paper, we shall refer to them as *nix. Now, let’s examine of the important components in the
architecture.

6.1 Host Agents
Host Agents are installed and run on each critical host in the network domain. They collect lowlevel details of the host’s system and configuration information. For Windows-based hosts, the
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Figure 5. Knowledge-based Alert Evaluation and Security Decision Support Framework

information gleaned can include OS version, service pack version, installed hotfixes, running
services and their versions etc. For *nix based hosts, the information includes OS version,
developer information, kernel version, installed modules, running services etc. Host Agents are
controlled by coordinator agents. Host Agents start to collect information under two situations:

(1) Response to Coordinator’s Request. Whenever relevant information is not present in
the network and host assets knowledge base, alert evaluation process issues a request
to the coordinator agents. The latter then requests the corresponding host agent to
collect that information and sends it back.
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(2) Automatic Update Host Information. After host’s each reboot, host agents
automatically start to collect information about that host and send them to the
coordinator agent. In addition, on a user-defined update interval, the host agents look
for updated host information periodically and send it to the coordinator agent.

Host agents are controlled by coordinator agents. Coordinator agents store information collected
by host agents into network and host assets knowledge base, which is then used in the evaluation
process.

6.2 Coordinator Agent
Coordinator agent coordinates with host agents. Host information collected from host agents are
first sent to the coordinator agent. The coordinator agent then stores the information in
appropriate places in the network and host assets knowledge base. Meanwhile, if the information
needed by an evaluation process is missing in the knowledge base, coordinator agent requests the
corresponding host agent to collect that information and sends it back. Secure mechanism is
needed to protect the communication between agents from being exploited.

6.3 Network Agent
Network agent manages an internal topology map of the protected network. Network agent
identifies the available assets on the network, their current state (up or down), IP address to
hostname match, open ports and the applications behind those ports, active TCP and UDP
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network services and hardware information etc. Network agent runs at intervals to maintain an
updated topology map of the protected network.

In practice, by examining only information provided from this network agent, one often can
easily tell roughly what kind of operating system the host is running. For instance, if we see port
136 is open, we can be quite confident to tell that system is running a windows operating system.
During the experiment with this process, we noticed that even the operating system information
itself can filter out quite a large portion of false positive alerts.

6.4 Network and Host Assets Knowledge Base
The dynamic network and host asset information collected by host agents and network agent are
stored in a network and host assets knowledge base. This information is then used to compare
with known vulnerability requirement information to evaluate alerts and provide security
solutions for real harmful attacks. In our current implementation, this knowledge base contains
two relational databases: network topology and hosts.

6.4.1 Network Topology Knowledge Base
The network topology relational database contains three relation tables: device, address and ports.

Table 1 enumerates the field definitions of entries in the device relational table. The device table
contains information about the state of the device, OS, device type, name etc. The devic_id field
serves as the foreign key which is used to cross link other tables.
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Table 1. Device Field Definitions

Field

Description

Example

Device_id

A unique id to identify the device
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Name

The name of the device

Siplab04

State

State information of the device(up/down)

Up

OS

The operating system information

Windows 2000 Pro

Device_type

The type of the device(pc,mac,router, switch,

PC

wireless access point etc)

Table 2 lists the field definitions of entries in the ports relational table. This table contains
information about current open ports in the network.
Table 2. Ports Field Definitions

Field

Description

Example

Port_id

A unique id to identify the port

218

Device_id

The device’s id to which the port belongs
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Number

The number of the port

80

Protocol

The protocol behind the port

HTTP

State

The state information about the port (open/close)

Open

Application

The application running the port

Linksys Router Web
Admin Server

Version

The version of the application

2.0

Extra_info

Some extra information

Device mode BEFSX41

The address table (Table 3) mainly contains IP address and host mapping information.
Table 3. Address Field Definitions

Field

Description

Example

Address_id

A unique id to identify the address
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Device_id

The device holding this address

045
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Address

The actual IP address

192.168.1.19

The above network topology knowledge base draws a topology map about the protected network.
This map contains basic information of the devices in the network. In practice, even some of
these basic information, for instance OS, can be used to filter out a reasonable amount of false
positive alerts or system immune alerts. For example, if we know that a target is running
Windows operating system, we can be reasonably confident to remove an attack attempting to
exploit vulnerabilities in Linux kernel 2.4. This network topology knowledge base is used in the
first step of the evaluation process. Those obvious false positive or system immune alerts such as
the above example are eliminated. Since the knowledge base contains only topology of the
network and some rough information of the hosts in the network, further analysis and appropriate
security solution cannot be provided by this knowledge. The host asset knowledge base provides
more detailed information about hosts in the protected network.

6.4.2 Host Assets Knowledge Base

This knowledge base contains detailed system and configuration information of hosts in the
protected network. In our current implementation, this knowledge base has two relational tables:
Windows and *nix.

In the Windows relational table, relevant host information including OS version, system root,
service pack, installed hotfixes, IE version and started services etc. are stored and updated. In the
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*nix relational table, the information stored includes: developer, version, kernel version, installed
packages and running services etc.

Detailed information contained in host assets knowledge base is used not only to provide further
evaluation of alerts but also facilitate security solution decision support by incorporating known
vulnerability information and security policy as well as contingency plan into the alert evaluation
process.

6.5 Known Vulnerability and Solution Knowledge Base
With the advances in network and all other related techniques, enterprise information networks
are getting more and more complex. But as the complexity of enterprise network increases, all
kinds of vulnerabilities inevitably exist in many aspects of contemporary enterprise networks.
Currently, there are a couple of independent organizations or commercial companies monitoring
the emergence of new vulnerabilities. New vulnerabilities with the infected system information
are then released to the public along with corresponding security solutions. These vulnerability
monitoring and reporting organizations, to name a few, include MITRE [CVE 2004],
SecurityFocus [SecurityFocus 2004], CERT [CERT/CC 2004], ISS [ISS 2004] etc. While each
of these organizations or companies maintain their own separate database, a common naming
scheme to cross-link the vulnerabilities was lacking. The foundation of CVE (Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposure) [CVE 2004] solved the problem. CVE is a list or dictionary that
provides common names for publicly known information security vulnerabilities and exposures.
Using a common name makes it easier to share data across separate databases and tools.
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Although CVE provides a common name scheme, it does not detail the infected system
requirements and the corresponding security solution information. On the other hand, some of
the other vulnerability monitoring organizations, such as SecurityFocus’s bugtraq, as well the
product vendors whose products are infected provide detailed information about systems that
could be infected by the vulnerabilities, and provide security solutions in the forms of patch
download, configuration suggestions and other methods to plug the security holes. Furthermore,
after the emergence of CVE naming scheme, many IDS products use CVE taxonomy to
reference their alerts. Therefore, by cross linking CVE vulnerability naming with the infected
system requirement as well as security solutions, we can accurately evaluate IDS alerts as well as
provide security decision support by incorporating vulnerability security solutions into IDS alerts.

In TRINETR current implementation of this knowledge base, there are two sub-knowledge bases:
(1) Windows vulnerability and solution knowledge base, and (2) *nix vulnerability and solution
knowledge base. Currently, we mainly focus on vulnerabilities of PC machines. The reason we
separate Windows vulnerability and *nix vulnerability is because Windows vulnerability is
relatively easier to check and vulnerability solution is also easier to find. The reason: there is
only one developer - Microsoft. In contrast to Windows vulnerability, *nix vulnerability is much
more complicated because it may involve may independent vendors and many different
implementation of a library. For instance, CAN-2003-0028( bugtraq 7123) [CAN 2004] is a Sun
XDR Library xdrmem_getbytes() Integer Overflow Vulnerability. In this vulnerability, an
integer overflow has been found in the xdrmem_getbytes() function. As a result, applications
implementing the vulnerable library call may be prone to denial of service attacks. But the
vulnerable library code has been implemented by various libraries including BSD's libc, Glibc,
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and Sun Microsystem's libnsl. As listed in SecurityFocus’s website, it involves more than 100
OS versions and more than 10 developers.

In the windows vulnerability and solution knowledge base, the following attributes are stored:

•

Vulnerability ID

•

Infected System Information
o OS Version
o Service Pack
o Application and version
o Enabled Network Service
o Configuration

•

Security Solution
o Solution
o Description

•

Reference
o CVE Reference of the Vulnerability

In the *nix vulnerability and solution knowledge base, the following attributes are stored:

•

Vulnerability ID

•

Infected System Information
o OS Developer
o Version
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o Modules
o Enabled Network Service
o Configuration

•

Security Solution
o Solution
o Description

•

Reference
o CVE Reference of the Vulnerability

The known vulnerability and solution knowledge base needs to be updated in time to include the
latest vulnerability found by those vulnerability monitoring companies as well as software
developers. The new vulnerability knowledge is added into the knowledge base through a
vulnerability directory service.

6.6 Vulnerability Directory Service
New vulnerability information is added in the knowledge base by vulnerability directory service
as they are announced. An exhaustive and “stay-current” knowledge base makes the alert
evaluation more accurate and efficient. There should be two ways to update vulnerability
knowledge base: (1) automatic retrieval from public vulnerability database and (2) user friendly
interface to input new vulnerabilities.
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In our current implementation, manual input is still required. In the future, we will explore the
methods to automatic retrieve from public vulnerability knowledge database.

6.7 Security Policy and Contingency Plan

Security policy is basically a plan, outlining what the company's critical assets are, and how they
must (and can) be protected. Its main purpose is to provide staff with a brief overview of the
"acceptable use" of any of the information assets, as well as to explain what is deemed as
allowable and what is not, thus engaging them in securing the company's critical systems.
Contingency plan clearly states what must be done in various emergency situations; the main
idea here should be to minimize and limit damage. Incident Response Capability should be
defined in advance. Incident Response Capability may simply be a designated point of contact
for users to report suspected incidents to, or it may be as formal as a team that uses proactive
methods and tools to prevent incidents.

By incorporating security policy into the alert evaluation process, we can ensure that critical
assets are better protected and the alert priority process is in concordance with enterprise
network’s interests. In addition, contingency plan provides some of the guidance in face of
malicious threats so that appropriate defense mechanisms could be taken to deter intrusion and
minimize damages.

An explanation of security policy and a simple sample security policy are included in Appendix
B.
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6.8 Expert System Engine
In our alert evaluation and security decision support framework, the evaluation processes are
executed by an expert system engine. After aggregation process, IDS alerts are asserted as
“facts” into the knowledge base. Appropriate evaluation process is then triggered by the assertion
of new alerts. We bring in an expert system into the framework due to the following reasons: (1)
IDS products should never be standalone. They should be used closely coupled with security
policy, contingency plan and other defense mechanisms. In reality, security policy and
contingency plan are often implemented with predefined security rules. Therefore, after the
evaluation process, certain defense actions triggered by these rules can be executed by the expert
system to deter intrusions. (2) By representing alerts as facts in knowledge base, we can query
the knowledge base to find relationships between facts (alerts). This is the primary purpose of
our third component – alert correlation-in the TRINETR architecture. In addition, predefined
defense rules can take actions based on the contents of one or more facts (alerts).

In our current implementation, a JESS expert system engine is deployed. All the evaluation
processes are implemented in Java.
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6.9 Alert Evaluation and Security Decision Support Process
in a Typical Scenario
Figure 6 depicts the alert evaluation and security decision support process in a typical scenario.
After alerts are clustered in the aggregation process, the representative alerts are then sent to the
evaluation process. The meta alerts contain the following information: a unique alert id, source,
target, time, classification and reference. Generated alerts are asserted as facts into the expert
system’s knowledge base. After new alerts are generated, according to their infected system,
either windows evaluation process or *nix evaluation process is loaded and executed. In the
example in Figure 6, the alert refers to CVE-2001-0341, which is a remote root gain
vulnerability infecting windows system. Consequently, the appropriate evaluation process is now
loaded to evaluate the alert. Figure 6 illustrates a typical evaluation process using this example.

The evaluation and security decision support process consists of eight steps. Table 4 explains the
steps in the process in details.

Table 4. Knowledge-based Alert Evaluation and Security Decision Support in a Typical Example

Step 1: Query the vulnerability knowledge

Yes.

base for CVE-2001-0341
Step 2. Retrieve CVE-2001-0341

OS: Windows 2000 Server Service Pack: 2

Vulnerability Information

Solution : Microsoft Patch Q311401 (URL)
OS: NT Enterprise Server 4.0 Service Pack :
6a
Solution : Microsoft Patch fpse2k (URL)
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……
……

Step 3. Identify target and use network

Target : Siplab04(File Server) OS: Windows

topology knowledge base to roughly evaluate

2000

Step 4. Retrieve 192.168.1.19’s host

OS: Windows 2000 Server Service Pack 2

information from host asset knowledge base

Installed Hotfixes: Q311401, Q311402

Step 5. Calculate Relevance Value

1

Step 6. Check if security solution is already

No. Patch Q311400 is missing

done
Step 7. Query security policy and contingency

Critical Assets: 192.168.1.19 (File Server)

plan

Contingency Plan: Page System Admin
Immediately and terminate connection

Step 8. Mark the alert as extremely high and

Extremely High

provide the security solution

Page System Admin Immediately, Terminate
Connection and download missing patch
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Figure 6. A Typical Alert Evaluation and Security Decision Support Process

The evaluation process first queries the vulnerability knowledge base to see whether CVE-20010341 vulnerability information is available or not. If not, the alert is marked as higher priority
alert and the vulnerability directory service is notified to update its knowledge base. Otherwise,
the vulnerability information concerning CVE-2001-0341 is retrieved from the knowledge base.
The evaluation process identifies the target and use network topology information to roughly
evaluate alerts. If the target’s OS is in the vulnerability list, the process then goes to next step.
Otherwise, the process marks the alert as lower priority alerts. In this example, the evaluation
process goes to next step to retrieve target 192.168.1.19’s host information. The relevant
information is then retrieved from host knowledge sub-base. The next step is the actual
evaluation process.

The evaluation process compares the target information against the
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vulnerability requirement information. A relevance score is calculated based on matches of the
information. The relevance score ranges from 0 to 1 with 1 meaning a perfect match and 0
meaning no match at all.

After relevance score is calculated, the evaluation process then

retrieves the security solution in the fact. The evaluation process now checks the security
solution with the target configuration. If security solution is already in the target configuration,
the alert is then marked as system immune alerts. If not, the evaluation process starts the next
step. The evaluation process then queries the security policy and contingent plan knowledge base.
In the security policy, target (192.168.1.19) is listed as a critical asset. Therefore, the evaluation
process marks the alert as extremely high alert. The associated rule in the contingent plan then
triggers response mechanism, which may include paging system administrator immediately,
downloading the patch identified in the security solution or terminating connection to the source
etc.

After the evaluation and security decision process, all alerts including system immune alerts are
sent to the correlation process. The reason why the system immune alerts are also included in the
correlation process is because they represent failed attempts. To profile each individual attacker
and each individual attack, not only successful penetrations should be included, but also those
failed intrusion attempts. The correlation process is described in details in the following chapter.
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Chapter 7

Alert Correlation

Traditional intrusion detection systems focus on low-level attacks or anomalies; they can only
generate isolated low-level alerts against each step of a series of intrusion activities. They cannot
capture the logical relations or attacking strategies behind these attacks. Consequently,
traditional intrusion detection systems often generate a large amount of low-level alerts, and the
alerts are emanated independently. In situations where there are intensive intrusions, not only
will actual alerts be mixed with false alerts, but the amount of alerts will be also become
unmanageable.

In reality, intelligent attackers often launch a series of plotted steps to achieve their final goals.
Their attacks are not isolated, but related as different stages of series of attacks, with the early
stages preparing for the later ones. Intuitively, the prerequisite of an intrusion is the necessary
condition for the intrusion to succeed. For example, the existence of a vulnerable service say IIS
4.0 without patch is the prerequisites of a remote IIS buffer overflow attack against service.
Usually, an intelligent attacker often carries out a series of probes of his target and collects its
system information before launching real attacks. The interesting system information may
include active IP address, open ports, the application running behind those open ports, operating
system version etc. After obtaining this footprint information, the hacker then can search and
study the vulnerabilities in these applications or operating systems. Some of the vulnerability
information may be made well known by security solution companies, research organizations, or
Internet bulletins. But due to the lack of security awareness, the target’s system administrators
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may not patch the system in time. In other cases, patching certain vulnerabilities may constrain
other functionalities provided by the system. Existing vulnerability gives the hacker a very good
chance to exploit the system. Consequently, after discovering an existing vulnerability in the
target, the hacker may then launch a buffer overflow attack exploiting the vulnerability against
the target. The success of this buffer overflow attack may give the hacker a root shell to access
the system. The hacker then can try many other things to play with the target. For instance, he
can plant a Trojan horse in the victim and open a back door so that he can access it later.

These series of intrusions: probes, buffer overflow, root shell attack, and Trojan horse can all be
caught by a sensitive IDS product. But all these attacks may only be caught as individual
intrusions. Traditional IDS products don’t thread them together and cannot find the logical
relations among them. Each of these attacks is treated as an independent attack. These isolated
alerts will then be mixed with all other unrelated alerts. The true relations among them would be
buried among thousands of isolated alerts.

Intrusion alert correlation research is motivated to target the above problem. By correlating
independent alerts generated by IDS products, we hope to find the logical relations among them.
The objectives of correlating alerts include the following:

1. Find the logical relations among alerts so that the attacker’s intrusion strategies could
be found and his final objectives as well as each step carried out to achieve the final
objectives could be disclosed.
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2. By finding how the intrusions are related, we can find different vulnerabilities in
network systems that could be used collectively to breach the system. As a result,
vulnerabilities could be made up as a whole, and better protection could be achieved.
3. By finding the relations among intrusions, we can find the prerequisite of some
intrusions. Therefore removing those prerequisites can minimize the chance of those
intrusions to succeed.
4. By discovering causal relations among intrusion events, we would be able to predict
the occurrence of certain intrusion given the observations of its precursor events.

In this research work, two correlation approaches have been used or studied. The first method is
a relatively simple attack scenario-oriented aggregation-based correlation approach. Related
alerts are aggregated based on several attack scenarios. By aggregating alerts into these different
scenarios, we hope to draw a clearer picture of the past and ongoing intrusion events occurred in
the protected network systems. Further studies could be carried out by system administrators to
obtain more evidences.

We then study the time series method in the application of intrusion correlation. Intrusion alerts
are treated as time series events occurred during a time interval. Classical time series statistical
methods are then used to test the logical relations among those events.
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7.1 A Simple Scenario-Oriented Aggregation-based Alert
Correlation.
In this correlation process, isolated alerts are aggregated into different groups according to
certain common characteristics. These aggregations are called “scenarios”. Each scenario is a
clustering of alerts having certain characteristics in common. Currently, the correlation process
aggregates alerts based on three axes: source, target and classification.

This aggregation-based alert correlation is relatively rough. By aggregating alerts into different
scenarios based on the above three axes, we can find many loose relations among them. For
instance, after aggregating alerts with the same target and belonging to same classification, we
can find a distributed attack against a single target using the same attack such as a DDoS attack.
Another example, we can also find an attacker tampering the same target with a series of attacks
by aggregating alerts with the same source and the same target.

Based on the combination of the three axes: source, target and classification, we can correlate
alerts into seven different scenarios.

Firstly, we use all three axes: source, target and classification to group alerts.
Scenario 1: Alerts with the same source, the same target and belonging to the same classification.
This allows us to detect, for instance, the same attacker who is launching a series of Buffer
Overflow attacks against a single Web server.
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Secondly, we loose the classification condition.
Scenario 2: Alerts with the same source and the same target.
This scenario allows us to detect an attacker who is attacking a target, for instance, a FTP server
with different approaches. By survey the past attacks, we can find the most attempted approach
to breach an application.

Thirdly, we loose the target condition and only keep the source axis.
Scenario 3: Alerts with the same source.
This scenario clusters all the attacks coming from the same attacker. It collectively displays all
the targets the attacker attempts and all the attack methods the attack exploits. For instance, it can
reveal the attack steps carried by the same hacker: he first tried a couple of probes to find active
IP address; then he launched several different Buffer Overflow attacks against a single target etc.

The fourth scenario comes when only the source and classification conditions are used.
Scenario 4: Alerts with the same source and classification.
This scenario allows one to detect the same attacks launched from a single attacker. It shows, for
instance, an attacker who is exploiting a RPC attack against multiple mail servers in a protected
network.

If we loose the source condition and keep the target and classification, we get the fifth scenario.
Scenario 5: Alerts with the same target and classification.
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This scenario allows one to detect, for instance, a distributed attack from different sources
against a single target and exploiting the same vulnerabilities. A distributed DNS attack from
multiple sources against the same target can be caught by this scenario.

If only target condition is used, it is the sixth scenario.
Scenario 6: Alerts with the same target.
This scenario allows one to find all attacks against the same target. It can show the different
exploits that have been attempted against the same target and from which sources.

The seventh scenario only deals with attacks exploiting the same methods.
Scenario 7: Alerts with the same classification.
This scenario reveals how many times the same exploiting methods have been used and against
which targets and from which sources. This scenario allows one to survey the same exploiting
methods, for instance a newly discovered vulnerability in IIS 5.0, having been attempted against
the protected network.

These seven different scenarios based on the combination of three axes: source, target and
classifications, organize isolated and scattered alerts into related clusters. These clusters show
more clearly the whole intrusion picture of the monitored network. They can also correlate some
loosely related alerts, for instance a distributed DNS attack against a single target, into a cluster
so that the DNS attack manifests itself more clearly.
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This simple scenario-oriented correlation can only find shallow relations among attacks. More
sophisticated and obscured logical relations among independent alerts cannot be extracted
through this approach.

Intrusion attacks can also be considered as time series events. They burst along a time interval
and certain attacks precede other ones. Therefore if we treat alerts as observations of time series
events, statistical time series analysis could be explored to find the logical relations among them.

7.2 A Study of statistical time series approach in alert
correlation
In this section, we study the application of statistical time series approach to alert correlation
analysis. It is stated in [Cabrera and Mehra 2002] that statistical time series analysis could be
used in network security events to extract causal relations among them.

In many applications of interest one is faced with the problem of identifying precursor events for
extraordinary phenomena. Well known examples include earthquakes and financial market
crashes, where the benefits of determining reliable precursors is of great importance. Network
security is another field in which the determination of reliable precursors can be very valuable in
detection and even prevention of malicious attacks. For instance, if certain abnormal activities
preceding a DNS attack could be identified as precursor events, system administrators could
prevent or minimize the detrimental effects of the attack by monitoring the occurrence of those
precursor events and taking appropriate actions after that.
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7.2.1 Time series analysis

Time series analysis [Fuller 1996, Hamilton 1994] has two main goals: (a) identifying the nature
of the phenomenon represented by the sequence of observations, and (b) forecasting (predicting
future values of the time series variable). Both of these goals require that the pattern of observed
time series data is identified and more or less formally described. Once the pattern is established,
we can interpret and integrate it with other data. Regardless of the depth of our understanding
and the validity of our interpretation (theory) of the phenomenon, we can extrapolate the
identified pattern to predict future events.

A time series is an ordered finite set of numerical values recorded from a variable of interest
along the time axis. It is assumed that the time elapsed between the recording of two consecutive
elements is constant. The k th element of the time series {y(k)} is denoted as y(k) where k=0,1,…,
N-1 where N denotes the number of elements in {y(k)}.

Events are defined in [Mannila 1997] as an ordered pair (A, k) where k= 0,1,2,…,K-1 is a time
index representing the occurrence time of the event and A ∈ ε is an Event Type. ε is a finite set.
Event types provide a framework for transforming the raw time series data into more meaningful
descriptions. The transformation from the time series space into the event space is the process of
Time Series Quantization.

70

τ
Definition 1 (Causal Rule). If A and B are two events, define A ⎯
⎯→
B as the rule: If A occurs,

τ
then B occurs within time τ . We say that A ⎯
⎯→
B is a Causal Rule.
τ
Definition 2 (Precursor Rule). If A and B are two events, define A ←
⎯⎯
B as the rule: If B
τ
⎯⎯
B is a
occurs, then A occurred not earlier than τ time units before B. We say that A ←

Precursor Rule.

It is shown [Cabrera and Mehra 2002] that the Granger Causality Test (GCT) can be used for
ranking candidate time series according to the likelihood that Precursor Rules exist. The Granger
Causality Index is related with the confidence of the Precursor Rules extracted from the time
series pairs.

7.2.2 The Granger Causality Test

The intuition of Granger Causality is that if an event X is the cause of another event Y, then the
event X should precede the event Y. Formally, testing for Granger Causality involves using
statistical tools for testing whether lagged information on a variable x provides any statistically
significant information about the variable Y. If not, then X does not Granger-cause y. The
Granger Causality Test (GCT-[Granger 1969]) compares the residuals of an AutoRegressive
Model (AR Model) with the residuals of an AutoRegressive Moving Average Model(ARMA
Model). Specifically, for two time series variables Y and X with size N, the Autoregressive
Model of Y is defined as:
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p

y ( k ) = ∑ δ i y ( k − i ) + e0 ( k )

(1)

i =1

Where parameter estimation is performed using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
The Autoregressive Moving Average Model of y is defined as:

p

p

i =1

i =1

y (k ) = ∑ a i y (k − i ) + ∑ β i x(k − i ) + e1 (k )

(2)

Here, p is a particular lag length, and parameter α i and β i are also estimated using Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS).

Let R0 be the sum of residuals of AR Model and R1 be the sum of residuals of ARMA Model,
we have
T

T

k =1

k =1

R0 = ∑ e0 (k ) and R1 = ∑ e1 (k )
The AR Model represents that the current value of variable y is predicted by its past p values.
The residuals R0 indicate the total sum squares of error. The ARMA Model represents that the
current value of y is predicted by the past p values of both variable y and variable x. The residual
R1 represents the sum of squares of prediction error.

The Null Hypothesis H 0 of the GCT is given by:
H 0 : β i = 0, i = 1,2,..., p,
i.e. x does not affect y up to a delay of p units.
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If the Granger Causality Index (GCI) g given by:
g=

( R0 − R1 ) / P
~ F ( p, T − 2 p − 1)
R1 /(T − 2 P − 1)

is greater than the specified critical value for the F-test, then reject the null hypothesis that x does
not Granger-cause y. Critical values of F-test depend on the degree of freedoms and significance
value. The critical values as g increases, the p-value associated with the pair ({x(k)}, {y(k)})
decreases, lending more evidence that the Null hypothesis is false. In other words, high values of
g are to be understood as representing strong evidence that x is causally related to y. Therefore
GCT can be used to compare the causality strength of several candidate input time series with
respect to a given output. Following the p-value interpretation, we say that { x1 (k ) } is more
likely than { x 2 (k ) } to be causally related with { y (k ) } if g1 f g 2 , where g i , i = 1,2 denote the
GCI for the input-output pair ( xi , y ) .

The intuition of GCI (g) is that it indicates how better variable y can be predicted using histories
of both variable x and y than using the history of y alone. In the ideal condition, the ARMA
model precisely predicts variable y with residual R1 = 0 , and the GCI value is infinite. Therefore,
the value of GCI (g) represents the strength of the causal relationship.

In usual statistical practice, the GCT is utilized to decide if a given x Granger causes y for a
specified significance level. No assumption is made about the presence of localized structure in
the time series. In these cases, one is interested in gauging how the time series x affects the time
series y as a whole. However, extracting precursor rules from time series events is extremely
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interesting in network security segment as the importance described previously. If time-localized
structures at x consistently precede time-localized structures at y, there is good evidence that
events in x are precursors of events in y.

Based on the above argument, the following procedure is adapted from the procedure provided in
[Cabrera and Mehra 2002], to find Granger-causality relations among events and extract
precursor rules.

1. Chose the interesting Phenomenon and apply Time Series Quantization at it { y (k )} .
2. Applying the GCT to each candidate input {xi (k )} . Select candidate inputs either by
setting a threshold on g i or by choosing the top scores. These inputs {x m (k )} are Granger
Causality related to { y (k )} .
3. Apply Time Series Quantization at {x m (k )} and examine the time-localized structures
of them. The input time series presenting time-localized structure preceding the
phenomenon { y (k )} are extracted as precursors of phenomenon { y (k )} .

To evaluate the effectiveness and validity of the above mechanism, the procedure is applied to
the DEF CON 9 Capture the Flag data sets.
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7.2.3 Experiments with DEF CON 9 Capture the Flag (CTF) data
sets.
DEF CON [DEFCON 2004] is an annual underground computer security conference held in Las
Vegas, Nevada. The conference attracts hackers, network administrators, government officials
and various other individuals from around the world with computer and computer security
interests. Each year DEF CON hosts the famed Capture The Flag contest [CAF 2004]. Hackers
from all over the world duke it out on the network for 72 hours, hacking for the title. The Shmoo
Group [Shmoo 2004] diligently logs every packet for posterity. The latest available data set is the
DEF CON 9.

In formulating time series events, we set up a series of time slots with equal time interval, in this
experiment 60 seconds, along time axis. Alerts with the same target, source or signature except
timestamps are treated as occurrence of a time series event A, where A = [ A1 , A2 ,..., An ] and An
is the count of occurrence of event A. Our experiment is adapted from [Qin and Lee 2003]. In
their experiment, they aggregated the original data to reduce the number of alerts. But we found
that for many of important attacks, only very few alerts were generated during the process.
Therefore aggregating them may cause a loss of information since counts of alerts are used to
represent the occurrence of attacks along time axis. In addition, we were also interested in
exploring the possibility of extracting precursor rules from the dataset.

After formulating time series event, we then apply GCT test for pair-wise alert correlation. First
a high priority or interesting alert is selected as a target alert with which other alerts are
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correlated. The GCT algorithm is applied to the corresponding alert time series. For instance, for
a target alert Y(k) whose time series is y(k) and another alert X(k) whose time series is x(k), we
compute GCT(x(k),y(k)) to correlate these two alerts. For the target alert Y, all the other alerts
related to this alerts (with similar attributes) are correlated with it. The GCT index g returned by
the GCT function represents the strength if X is causally related to Y. We record the alerts whose
GCI values have passed the F-distribution test as candidates of causal alerts, and rank order the
candidate alerts according to their GCI values. The top candidate alerts are then selected to be
further investigated.

From the following, we denote the following: Host A: 10.255.100.252, Host B: 10.255.10.41 and
Host C: 10.255.10.34.

We first select DDOS_shaft alerts targeting at Host A as target alert and apply the GCT to
correlate it with other alerts. Since it is a DDOS attack, source attribute is not included in time
series formulation and all other alerts targeting Host A are included in the correlation test. Based
on the correlation results, a causal alert is picked up as the next target alert. This time, only alerts
with the same source attribute will be included in this step. The following tables (Table 5 to
Table 7) show the corresponding GCT correlation results with regard to the selected target alerts,
i.e., DDoS_Shaft_Host_A, Delegate_Overflow_Host_B, DDOS_Stacheldraht_Host_C.

Table 5. DDos_Shaft_Host A GCI Values

Alert

Target Alert

Delegate_Overflow_Host_B

DDos_Shaft_Host_A 8.56
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GCT Index

DDOS_Stacheldraht_Host_C

DDos_Shaft_Host_A 7.33

TFTP_GET_passwd

DDos_Shaft_Host_A 5.44

MISC_Tiny_Fragments

DDos_Shaft_Host_A 5.23

SNMP_private_access_udp

DDos_Shaft_Host_A 4.89

WEB_CGI_websendmail_access

DDos_Shaft_Host_A 4.27

SNMP_request_udp

DDos_Shaft_Host_A 2.76

Table 6. Delegate_Overflow_Host_B GCI Values

Alert

Target Alert

GCT Index

WEB-IIS _mem_bin access

Delegate_Overflow_Host_B

6.74

WEB-IIS unicode directory traversal Delegate_Overflow_Host_B

5.43

attempt
WEB-FRONTPAGE /_vti_bin/ access

Delegate_Overflow_Host_B

5.12

WEB-IIS multiple decode attempt

Delegate_Overflow_Host_B

4.86

SCAN Amanda client version request

Delegate_Overflow_Host_B

3.75

Table 7. DDoS_Stacheldraht_Host_C GCI Values

Alert

Target Alert

SCAN nmap TCP

DDOS_Stacheldraht_Host_C 7.75

SCAN SOCKS Proxy

DDOS_Stacheldraht_Host_C 7.40

Attempt
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GCT Index

ICMP PING NMAP

DDOS_Stacheldraht_Host_C 6.98

FIN scan

DDOS_Stacheldraht_Host_C 6.57

XMAS scan

DDOS_Stacheldraht_Host_C 5.77

The following attack scenario graph is constructed based on GCT correlation results and alert
analysis.

Figure 7. Attack Scenarios: GCT Correlation Results

Figure 7 shows that the attackers first launch a series of WEB probes against the target to collect
target information and then a buffer overflow attack is attempted against the target to get root
access. A set of scan probes are also carried out by the attackers followed by a DDOS attack.
Since the attackers are from the same subnet, we can reasonably believe that they belong to the
same group of attackers.

78

The precursor step is also carried out to verify the occurrence time sequences. It is found that
most of the scan and probing related alerts precede buffer overflow attack, which then precedes
the DDOS attack. This precursor rule is also natural since most of attackers launch scans to
collect target information before actual attacks. Buffer overflow is also commonly used to gain
root access.

7.2.4 Conclusion

In the DEF CON dataset, the experiment finds some reasonable scenarios as well as precursor
rules, but due to the nature of the DEF CON dataset (no true background data is provided), we
cannot comprehensively evaluate the success rate of the alert correlation method.

The main strength of this approach lies in that it can discover alert correlation without prior
knowledge about attack behaviors and how attacks are related when finding candidate alert
correlations. In addition, the approach can also reduce the workload of security analysts in that
they can focus on the causal alert candidates output by the GCT for further analysis.

But better quality dataset with real background information is needed to comprehensively
evaluate the successful rate of this correlation approach. The precursor rules extracted from the
dataset are still too simple and can only weakly validate the approach. In addition, in DEF CON9,
due to its real contest nature, most of alerts in the datasets are only probing related. Many of the
alerts are only access attempts. A better dataset, with well-designed and closely coupled alerts
with strong correlation relationships, could provide better evaluation results for the experiment.
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Chapter 8

Implementation and Experiments

8.1 Testbed Setup
Two different IDS: Snort [Snort 2004] and Prelude [Prelude 2004] are deployed in our testbed.
These two IDSs are installed in a Redhat [Redhat 2004] 9.0 Linux system, which is called the
intrusion detection console (IDC), to monitor a subnet with heterogeneous operating systems and
different configurations. The network interface of the IDC is set in promiscuous mode so that it
could listen to all traffic on the subnet. (In this sense, the IDC is also a snoop server.) The IDC
interface is plugged in a hub with which the other systems are also connected. The reason a hub
is used instead of a switch is because hub is a shared media which allows a promiscuous mode
interface to capture all traffic going through the hub including traffic not going to the interface.
In contrast, in a switched media, communication is point-to-point through dedicated lines. A
message goes only to the destination node. Direct connection is set up by the switch. Therefore,
it is impossible for a node in a switch media to intercept and read every packet going through the
subnet. There is an exception: in some special switches, there is one dedicated port called tap
which can mirror all traffic to that port. Consequently, any network driver listening to this
special port can actually capture all traffic going through.

The hub is then connected to a switch. The switch is used to segment a testbed which simulates a
small subnet with heterogeneous hosts. In the subnet, a couple of machines are running with
multiple operating systems. The operating systems include Windows 2000, Window XP, Redhat
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Linux 9.0 etc. To achieve better heterogeneousness, even the same operating system, they are
configured in different ways. For instance, one Windows 2000 host with SP1 installed and
another one with Windows 2000 SP2 installed. The systems can function as different servers, for
instance File server, Mail server and Ftp server etc. A group of computers outside the subnet is
used by attackers to carry out the simulated intrusion activities.

Figure 8 illustrates the topology configuration of the testbed.

Figure 8. Testbed Topology Setup
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8.2 System Programming and Testing
The alert aggregation process is implemented as Perl scripts. For each IDS, a Perl script is
written. This Perl script serves as an IDMEF agent to that IDS sensor, converting its alerts into
the standard IDMEF format and storing alerts into a MySQL [MySQL 2004] relational database.
Host, coordinator and network agents are also implemented in Perl. . Host Agents start to collect
information under two situations: (1) Response to Coordinator’s Request (2) Automatic Update
Host Information periodically.

A Jess Expert Engine [JESS 2004] is deployed to be used in the evaluation process. Evaluation
processes are implemented as Java classes and are loaded on demand by Jess Engine to evaluate
the corresponding alerts. The evaluation processes are classified into two types. One is a generic
process. In this case, vulnerability information is stored as facts in known vulnerability and
solution knowledge base. The vulnerability information only contains infected operating system
version, security solutions etc. The generic evaluation process is used to roughly evaluate alerts
provided detailed known vulnerability and solution requirements are not available in the
knowledge base. The other type of evaluation process type is very detailed evaluation processes
specifically designed to address a single well known vulnerability. Many of the vulnerabilities
involve many different implementations and versions. For instance, the vulnerability CAN-20030028( bugtraq 7123) [CAN 2004] is a Sun XDR Library xdrmem_getbytes() Integer Overflow
Vulnerability. In this vulnerability, an integer overflow has been found in the xdrmem_getbytes()
function. As a result, applications implementing the vulnerable library call may be prone to
denial of service attacks. But the vulnerable library code has been implemented by various
libraries including BSD's libc, Glibc, and Sun Microsystem's libnsl. As listed in SecurityFocus’s
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website, it involves more than 100 OS versions and more than 10 developers. In this case, it is
difficult to implement the vulnerability as facts in the knowledge base. A very specific detailed
evaluation process is implemented to evaluate this specific vulnerability. Our implementation
strategy is similar to virus scanner. As soon as a new vulnerability is announced, either a specific
evaluation process could be developed and provided to be downloaded and executed in the
knowledge base to evaluate the specific vulnerability or a vulnerability fact could be inserted in
the facts base to include the newly discovered vulnerability. The update of a new evaluation
process and vulnerability facts is conducted through vulnerability directory service. In our
current implementation, only manual update is implemented. In our future version, automatic
vulnerability knowledge update will be explored.

Some of the evaluation processes are provided as samples in the Appendix C. Sample fact rules
are also included in the Appendix C.

Finally, a PHP web portal is provided as user interface to view the alerts and information asset
information. The web portal provides a central and convenient place to view the evaluated alert
information, correlated alerts and management alerts. We are also extending the web portal to
provide more functionalities including controlling host services, carrying out count attack tasks
etc.

We then extensively tested the prototype system with more than 100 attack scripts. We noticed
that during our experiment, the aggregation process can significantly reduce the amount of alerts
by roughly a factor of 10 by removing duplicates and obvious irrelevant alerts. To test the
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evaluation and security decision support performance, we deliberately designed our attacks in
order to generate system immune alerts and false positives. For instance, we attacked one of our
Linux hosts with several IIS buffer overflow attacks, and attacked one of our Window 2000
machines with Service Pack 3 installed containing the necessary hotfix with an attack exploiting
certain vulnerability in Service Pack 2. But during the experiment, all of the attacks were
detected by Snort and Prelude and some of the generated alerts were marked with the highest
severity. But the knowledge-based evaluation process successfully evaluated them as system
immune alerts. Furthermore, we also launched some exploits which would be certainly
vulnerable to the targets. This time the alert evaluation process not only marked them as high
priority alerts, but also suggested to us the corresponding security solutions to help make security
response decisions.

Figure 9 to Figure 23 are the snapshots of web interface which display alert information with
different choice.
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Figure 9. TRINETR Alert Management Console Snapshot 1

Figure 9 shows the web interface of the TRINETR Alert Management Console. From this figure,
we can see that Snort generated 104 alerts and Prelude generated 18 alerts. These alerts were
aggregated into 19 hyper alerts. Among these 19 alerts, there was only 1 high priority alert. The
other 18 alerts were rated as system immune or false positive alerts after the evaluation process.
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Figure 10. TRINETR Alert Management Console Snapshot 2

Figure 10 shows the high priority alerts and corresponding security support suggestions.

Figure 11. TRINETR Alert Management Console Snapshot 3

Figure 11 shows all the alerts generated by snort.
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Figure 12. TRINETR Alert Management Console Snapshot 4

Figure 12 shows all alerts emanated by Prelude.

Figure 13. TRINETR Alert Management Console Snapshot 5

Figure 13 shows the system immune or false positive alerts. Note that some of the alerts are
originally ranked as high severity by Snort and Prelude.
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Figure 14. TRINETR Alert Management Console Snapshot 6

Figure 14 shows network information including active host, open ports and application version
etc.

Figure 15. TRINETR Alert Management Console Snapshot 7

Figure 15 shows a simple network topology and IP address to host match.
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Figure 16. TRINETR Alert Management Console Snapshot 8

Figure 16 shows detailed host system information

Figure 17. TRINETR Alert Management Console Snapshot 9

Figure 17 shows the correlated alerts with same source, target and attack class.

89

Figure 18. TRINETR Alert Management Console Snapshot 10

Figure 18 shows the correlated alerts with the same source and target.

Figure 19. TRINETR Alert Management Console Snapshot 11

Figure 19 shows the correlated alerts with the same target and attack class.
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Figure 20. TRINETR Alert Management Console Snapshot 12

Figure 20 shows the correlated alerts with the same source and attack class.

Figure 21. TRINETR Alert Management Console Snapshot 13

Figure 21 shows the correlated alerts with the same source.
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Figure 22. TRINETR Alert Management Console Snapshot 14

Figure 22 shows the correlated alerts with the same target.

Figure 23. TRINETR Alert Management Console Snapshot 15

Figure 23 shows the correlated alerts with the same attack class.
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Chapter 9

Related Work

One of the active research areas in the intrusion detection community is the development of
technologies to manage, analyze and interpret intrusion detection alerts produced by IDS
products. One research similar to our work is M-Correlator [Porras et al. 2002]. In M-Correlator,
they used a mission-impact-based approach to the analysis of security alerts produced by
heterogeneous information security devices. In M-Correlator, Nmap [NMAP 2004] is used to
generate a topology map of the protected network. After that, M-Correlator develops a relevant
score that assesses per alert, the likelihood of successful intrusion. The topology map is similar
to the network agent in TRINETR. But Nmap can only give a rough map of the protected
network. For instance, the results obtained from Nmap are still guesses. It may not be able to tell
whether the operating system is exactly Windows Me or Windows 2000 Pro. Furthermore, MCorrelator does not provide decision support after alert ranking.

Lee and Kim [Lee and Kim 2001] analyzed the requirements of the Decision Support System for
Network Security Management. A prototype is also implemented to provide the basic functions
of a design of the described system. But the design is only used for intrusion prevention. No real
time security decision assistance is provided.

Although the knowledge-based alert evaluation component in TRINETR shares many common
attributes with the above projects. It is quite different from the above two. The network topology
and host information obtained in TRNETR is much more detailed than M-Correlator. M-
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Correlator provides a rough alert evaluation based on the “guesses” obtained by NMAP.
Although even this rough evaluation can rule out a significant amount of system immune alerts
and false positive alerts, for instance knowing the target is running Linux can certainly discard
alerts exploiting vulnerabilities in IIS 4.0, it does not provide accurate evaluation. For instance, a
NMAP scan can find if a hosting is running Windows 2000. But it cannot find whether its patch
is Service Pack 2 or 3. Consequently, M-Correlator cannot provide appropriate security solution
suggestions to system administrator even though it knows which vulnerability the attacker is
attempting to exploit, since it doesn’t have the target’s detailed information.

In TRINETR, we take the evaluation process further. After alert evaluation, appropriate security
solution suggestion is provided to the system administrator to facilitate the decision making. The
security solution suggestion is drawn based on the attack’s attributes and the target’s system
information. Therefore, instead of providing only a short description of the emanated alerts,
TRINETR also provides appropriate security solution suggestion. This step can significant
reduce system administrator’s workload since he doesn’t have to look for security solutions by
himself. It is especially helpful in thwarting an urgent real time intrusion activity.

Lee and Kim’s prototype is more intrusion prevention oriented in that it is prior to real time
intrusion. It is helpful in finding vulnerabilities existing in a network and filling the security
holes. But it provides little help while deterring real-time, ongoing intrusion attempts.

Realizing the limitations of single detection mechanism and system, researchers start to explore
the collaboration among different IDS products. The first IDS collaboration research was
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initiated in the IDES [Lunt 1990] project and then refined in the EMERALD [Porras and
Neumann 1997] project. Currently there are a number of projects in the area of alert aggregation
and the false positive reduction. Honeywell is developing Argus, a qualitative Bayesian
estimation technology to combine results from multiple intrusion detection systems [Geib and
Goldman 2000]. Cuppens [Cuppens and Miege 2002, Cuppens 2001] is developing an intrusion
detection aggregation and correlation module (MIRADOR) using Snort and e-trust. An expertsystem-based approach for similarity formulation is used in their work. SRI international [Valdes
and Skinner 2001] is using a probability-based approach to attribute similarity recognition.
Another approach is the Tivoli Enterprise suggested by Debar and Wespi [Debar and Wespi
2001]. Their correlation method uses a consequence mechanism to specify what types of alerts
may follow a given alert type. Ning, Cui and Reeves [Ning and Reeves 2002] try to uncover the
attack scenarios based on the specification of individual attacks. Their method uses graphs to
represent correlated alerts.

Another remarkable research effort is the Intrusion Detection Force [Teo et al. 2003(a)] which
envisions a global Internet-scale defense infrastructure that would protect organizations and
defend the Internet as a whole. The information sharing and intrusion detection correlation is
also based on internet-scale.

The alert correlation in TRINETR consists of two parts. The first part is a simple scenariooriented aggregation-based alert correlation, which is incorporated in the alert management
console. Alerts generated by IDS products are often isolated and independent. The scenariooriented aggregation-based alert correlation groups alerts sharing common attributes into the
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same clusters. The arrangement of these attributes can reveal different attack scenarios. For
instance, by grouping attributes with the same target and attack class but different sources, a
DDoS attack can be easily found since all of the related alerts are clustered into the same group.

The second part of this correlation is a study of application of time series analysis to the alert
correlation process. The study is adapted from [Cabrera and Mehra 2002] and [Qin and Lee
2003]. In this study, intrusion alerts are considered as events. The occurrence of these events
corresponds to a series of time events. Granger Causality Test is applied to extract precursor rule
and test the causality relations among them. The key strength of the approach is that it doesn’t
depend on priority knowledge about alerts, for instance the pre-specified correlation rules. In this
sense it is similar to the anomaly-based detection. Intelligent attackers do not follow “rules”.
They often intentionally disguise their attack patterns to avoid detection. Therefore a rule-based
correlation approach cannot find new correlation patterns just as signature-based detection
cannot find new intrusion methods. In addition, it is difficult to define exhaustively all of the
correlation patterns. A slight change in attack sequence may result in a new correlation pattern.
The GCT test can also list a couple of correlation candidates based on GCI values. This
screening can facilitate security analysts to narrow down their targets, therefore reduce their
workload.

In this study, the time series statistical correlation approach still needs to be further evaluated
with better quality alert datasets. But one can make this conclusion: even this approach can find
causal relation and extract certain precursor rules among alerts domain expertise is still needed to
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make decisions. Therefore this approach is more suitable to be used in knowledge-training of a
correlation system in defining correlation patterns or rules.
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Chapter 10 Conclusion and Future Work

In recent years, internet society has been experiencing an explosion of cyber attacks. Due to our
widespread and deeply reliance on computer networks, these rapidly growing threats from
malicious cyber attackers have resulted in great damage from many aspects. Intrusion detection
is a software system or hardware device deployed to monitor network and host activities
including data flows and information accesses etc. and detect suspicious activities. Its main
purpose is to detect real-time, ongoing intrusions and alert system administrators so that
defensive actions could be taken to thwart the intrusions or discover the damages if the attacks
had already succeeded. In recent years, intrusion detection has begun to gain wide acceptance in
enterprises as a necessary and worthwhile investment on security.

Despite recent success of intrusion detection systems, they still present many weaknesses. Some
of these weaknesses are so critical that they will determine the future of widespread acceptance
of IDS. The weaknesses addressed in our work include: alert flooding, excessive false positive
alerts, lack of context awareness and lack of security support etc.

To address the above weaknesses challenging IDS products, we are developing an intrusion alert
management and analysis system, dubbed as TRINETR, using intelligent agents and knowledgebased alert evaluation to facilitate security decision support upon the occurrence of real time
intrusion. In our work, a novel generic architecture is developed to manage, analyze, deal with
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alerts and cooperate multiple IDS products. The architecture is composed of three components:
(1) Alert Aggregation, (2) Knowledge-based Alert Evaluation and Security Decision Support,
and (3) Alert Correlation.

Alert Aggregation is the process of collecting alerts from multiple IDS products, converting them
into a standard format and clustering them based on defined similarities. Aggregated alerts are
then stored in a relational database for later analysis. Aggregation is the first component of the
alert management and analysis system and it is also an important component. By appropriate
aggregation process, the amount of alerts can be significantly reduced. Scattered, random alerts
are aggregated into related alert groups to be further analyzed by other components

The core of this architecture is the knowledge-based alert evaluation and security decision
support framework that incorporates dynamic network and host assets information and common
known vulnerability knowledge into the alert evaluation process. With the knowledge
information asset, every piece of useful information is stored in a centralized place. The
evaluation task is also performed in this centralized process. No alert filtering, signature tuning
and corresponding administration overhead are needed. This framework can not only be used to
provide alert prioritization but also to provide real time security solution suggestions for decision
support for each generated alert.

The main purpose of alert correlation component is to find logical relationships among the alerts.
Attackers are likely to launch a series of attacks against targets. Traditional IDS systems can only
generate isolated alerts based on each attack it detects. Intelligent hackers are more likely to
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disguise their real purpose by launching many other minor attacks. Alert correlation component
is used to correlate alerts based on logical relationships among the alerts. This component
provides system security operators with great insight into where the initial attacks come from and
where they actually end up. This component can also be used to find patterns among series of
attacks. After the alert correlation, a high-level report providing an overall view of the attacks is
presented to the system security operators. In TRINETR’s current implementation, a simple
scenario oriented aggregation-based alert correlation is used. Isolated and independent alerts are
clustered into aggregate groups based on the combinations of common attributes. These
combinations of common attributes including source, target and attack class actually correspond
to several different attack scenarios. Therefore this scenario-oriented correlation can reveal
certain attacks, for instance, a DDoS attack against a single target.

Time series analysis is also studied in terms of its application to alert correlation. In this case,
intrusion alerts are treated as events. A series of related alerts constitute the repeated occurrence
of certain event. Granger Causality Test is applied to these events in the hope to find causality
relations and extract precursor rules among them. The key strength of this approach is that it
does not depend on prior knowledge about alerts. Therefore unlike explicit rule-based alert
correlation, this approach can find new correlation patterns. During our experiment using DEF
CON dataset, the approach can reveal some causality relations and extract simple precursor rules
among attacks. But due to the quality of the dataset, further evaluation is still needed in order to
implement this approach in real systems. This approach is more suitable in discovering rules or
correlation patterns with a training dataset.
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With the increasingly widespread deployment of security mechanisms, such as firewall, IDS,
anti-virus software, the problem of alert analysis has become very important. In an effort to make
the management and use of intrusion detection system easier and more efficient, to make IDS
alerts more accurate in terms of reflecting real threats and facilitate security decision making in
the presence of ongoing attacks, we will continue the work in the field of IDS management and
analysis of INFOSEC data. More specifically, the following plans could be carried out as future
work.

1. A XML based vulnerability and security solution reference system. CVE is a list or
dictionary that provides common names for publicly known information security
vulnerabilities and exposures. But CVE does not provide detailed security solution
information regarding the vulnerabilities listed. By providing a standard XML based
vulnerability and security solution reference system, it would facilitate the security
decision making process.

2. The close correlation among different IDS systems especially host-based and networkbased IDS products. By appropriate correlation of the alerts from different IDS systems,
we will be able to verify the occurrence of certain attacks. For instance, a network-based
IDS detects a suspicious remote buffer-overflow attack to get shell access to a server
machine. But due to its limitation, it does not know what is really going on inside that
host after that. Meanwhile, a host-based IDS system deployed inside the server detects a
suspicious shell process and generates an alert. Therefore by correlating these alerts from
the two different IDS products, the system security operator can further confirm that
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some remote shell access attack is in progress. Furthermore, since each IDS product has
its own “blind” spots, a correlation can help to remove some of the false negatives.

3. Automatic synthetic alert report generation. Alert reports containing both synthetic alerts
providing an overall picture of once isolated alerts and the security solutions based on the
predefined enterprise security plan and contingency plan will be automatically generated.
Alert statistical information based on the attack source, target, exploited vulnerabilities,
attack classification and other useful statistics will also be calculated or surveyed and
provided in graphical forms.

4. Further Granger Causality Test’s application in alert correlation. Better quality dataset is
needed to further evaluate GCT test in its application in alert correlation. The approach of
extracting explicit rules from a data set by using GCT test shall be explored as well.

5. Exploring the possibility of using other time series tests other than GCT and other
statistical approach in alert correlation. Time series analysis is widespread used in many
fields such as economics, earthquake study and prediction. There are many
implementations of causality test. The feasibilities of other tests shall be explored in alert
correlation. Finally, other statistical approaches, for instance multi-variate analysis, shall
be studied in their applications to intrusion alert correlation.

Other plans include studying the intrusion detection mechanisms in P2P systems, exploring
intrusion tolerance approaches etc.
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In short, this TRINETR project is not an end. It shall serve a starting point or springboard for our
future work in network security.
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APPENDIX A: Intrusion Detection Message Exchange
Format (IDMEF)
Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) [IDMEF 2004] is an output of Intrusion
Detection Working Group (IDWG). IDWG [IDWG 2004] is a charter of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) [IETF 2004] Working Groups. The other outputs of IDWG include (a) A
requirements document, which describes the high-level functional requirements for
communication between intrusion detection systems and requirements for communication
between intrusion detection systems and with management systems, including the rationale for
those requirements. Scenarios are used to illustrate the requirements. (b) A framework document,
which identifies existing protocols best used for communication between intrusion detection
systems, and describes how the devised data formats relate to them.

The purpose of the Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) is to define data
formats and exchange procedures for sharing information of interest to intrusion detection and
response systems, and to the management systems which may need to interact with them.

The current Internet-Draft [IDMEF 2004] provided by IDWG describes a data model to
represent information exported by intrusion detection systems, and explains the rationale for
using the model.
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The relationship between the principal components of the data model is shown in Figure 24
(occurrence indicators and attributes are omitted).

Figure 24. UML Diagram of IDMEF Model Overview
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The top-level class for all IDMEF messages is IDMEF-Message; each type of message is a
subclass of this top-level class. There are presently two types of messages defined; Alerts and
Heartbeats. Alert messages are intrusion detection alerts. Heartbeat messages indicate the status
of intrusion detection system itself. Within each message, subclasses of the message class are
used to provide the detailed information carried in the message.

It is important to note that the data model does not specify how an alert should be classified or
identified. For example, a port scan may be identified by one analyzer as a single attack against
multiple targets, while another analyzer might identify it as multiple attacks from a single source.
However, once an analyzer has determined the type of alert it plans to send, the data model
dictates how that alert should be formatted.

(1) Alert Message.

Generally, every time an analyzer detects an event that it has been configured to look for, it
sends an Alert message to its manager(s). Depending on the analyzer, an Alert message may
correspond to a single detected event, or multiple detected events. Alerts occur asynchronously
in response to outside events.

An Alert message is composed of 9 subclasses, as shown in Figure 24. The subclasses include:
Analyzer, CreateTime, Classification, DetectTime, AnalyzerTime, Source, Target, Assessment,
and AdditionalData. Among these 9 subclasses, Analyzer, Source, Target, Classification, and
AdditionalData - are the core parts of Alerts and Heartbeats. Each of the 9 subclasses is
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composed of further subclasses and attributes. These subclasses and attributes provide detailed
information about the alert. In addition to these classes, there are three other classes which
inherit from Alert classes. These three Alert classes are ToolAlert, CorrelationAlert and
OverflowAlert.

The ToolAlert class carries additional information related to the use of attack tools or malevolent
programs such as Trojan horses, and can be used by the analyzer when it is able to identify these
tools; The CorrelationAlert class carries additional information related to the correlation of alert
information. The OverflowAlert carries additional information related to buffer overflow attacks.

The Alert class has one attribute: messageid Optional, which is a unique identifier for the alert.

(2) Heartbeat Class

Analyzers use Heartbeat messages to indicate their current status to managers. Heartbeats are
intended to be sent in a regular period, say every ten minutes or every hour. The receipt of a
Heartbeat message from an analyzer indicates to the manager that the analyzer is up and running;
lack of a Heartbeat message (or more likely, lack of some number of consecutive Heartbeat
messages) indicates that the analyzer or its network connection has failed.

All managers must support the receipt of Heartbeat messages; however, the use of these
messages by analyzers is OPTIONAL. Developers of manager software SHOULD permit the
software to be configured on a per-analyzer basis to use/not use Heartbeat messages.
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A Heartbeat message is composed of several subclasses including Analyzer, CreateTime,
AnalyzerTime, AdditionalData. The same as Alert class, the Heartbeat class has only one
attribute: messageid Optional, which is a unique identifier for the heartbeat.

(3) A Sample Alert encoded in IDMEF.

The following example provided in the draft (IDMEF 2004) shows how IDMEF is used to
encode alert data. The example is a network-based detection of a “ping of death” attack.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<!DOCTYPE IDMEF-Message PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD RFC XXXX IDMEF v1.0//EN"
"idmef-message.dtd">

<IDMEF-Message version="1.0" xmlns="urn:iana:xml:ns:idmef">
<Alert messageid="abc123456789">
<Analyzer analyzerid="bc-sensor01">
<Node category="dns">
<name>sensor.example.com</name>
</Node>
</Analyzer>
<CreateTime ntpstamp="0xbc71f4f5.0xef449129">
2000-03-09T10:01:25.93464Z
</CreateTime>
<Source ident="a1a2" spoofed="yes">
<Node ident="a1a2-1">
<Address ident="a1a2-2" category="ipv4-addr">
<address>192.0.2.200</address>
</Address>
</Node>
</Source>
<Target ident="b3b4">
<Node>
<Address ident="b3b4-1" category="ipv4-addr">
<address>192.0.2.50</address>
</Address>
</Node>
</Target>
<Target ident="c5c6">
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<Node ident="c5c6-1" category="nisplus">
<name>lollipop</name>
</Node>
</Target>
<Target ident="d7d8">
<Node ident="d7d8-1">
<location>Cabinet B10</location>
<name>Cisco.router.b10</name>
</Node>
</Target>
<Classification text="Ping-of-death detected">
<Reference origin="cve">
<name>CVE-1999-128</name>
<url>http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE1999-128</url>
</Reference>
</Classification>
</Alert>
</IDMEF-Message>

In the above example, the IDMEF alert message is implemented in XML. IDMEF can be
implemented in different ways. XML solution is suggested by IDWG as the best at fulfilling the
IDWG requirements.
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APPENDIX B: Network Security Policy
Before a network can be secured, a network security policy has to be established. The network
security policy is basically a plan, outlining what the company's critical network assets are, and
how they must (and can) be protected. Its main purpose is to provide staff with a brief overview
of the "acceptable use" of any of the network assets, as well as to explain what is deemed as
allowable and what is not, thus engaging them in securing the company's critical systems. The
policy will weigh possible threats against the value of productivity and efficiency and identify
the different corporate assets which need different levels of protection. Without a network
security policy, a proper security framework cannot be established. Employees cannot refer to
any established standards and security controls would be circumvented for the sake of increasing
efficiency.

Although network security policies are very subjective and can be quite different for different
organizations, they are primarily composed of two core parts: Risk Analysis and Risk
Management [WindowsSecurity 2004].

(1) Risk Analysis (or identifying the risk)

Risk Analysis is the process of identifying the critical assets of the network and their use and
functionality. To secure a network, the very first information should be acquainted is the network
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itself. Essentially, risk analysis is a process to know WHAT you are trying to protect, from
WHOM you are trying to protect it and most importantly, HOW you are going to protect it.
During the analysis process, the following categories should be carefully examined:

o Hardware: All servers, workstations, personal computers, laptops, removable media

(CD's, floppies, tapes, etc.), Wireless Access Point, communication lines, etc.

o Software: Identify the risks of a potential security problem due to unpatched software, etc.

Also take into account the potential issues with staff installing various file sharing
applications software, entertainment or freeware software coming from unknown and
untrustworthy sources.

o Personnel: Those who have access to confidential information, sensitive data, those who

"own", administer or in any way modify existing databases. Incidental handling team
should also be established to deal with contingencies.

After knowing the protected network itself, the next key process in implementing a network
security policy is to identify the enemies and what to do to thwart those hostile attacks.

(2) Risk Management (identifying The Threats and Anti-Threat Mechanism)

As previously stated, different security policy could be implemented in different ways due to its
subjective nature. But during a Risk Management process, the following key elements should be
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considered:

o Authentication: including best practices for password management and other

authentication mechanism.

o Virus Protection: involving best practices for malicious code protection etc.

o Software Installation: is freeware software forbidden, if allowed, under what conditions,

how is software piracy tolerated, are entertainment/games allowed or completely
prohibited as well the installation of any other program coming from unknown and
untrustworthy sources;

o Removable Media(CD's, floppy): "Acceptable Use" measures need to be established, the

dangers of potential malicious code entering the company network or any other critical
system need to be explained as well;

o Encryption: explain when, how and who must encrypt any of the company's data;

o System Backups: the advantage of having backups needs to be explained; who is

responsible, and how often should the data be backed up;

o Maintenance: the risks of a potential physical security breach need to be briefly explained;
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o Incident Handling: The disaster contingency plan explains what actions need to be carried

out and how an organization will recover from any type of natural disaster or attack,
including attacks from hackers and employees. For example, it might include security
measures for backing up servers, detailing how often backups must be performed and
how backups must be stored off-site. The disaster contingency plan might also list the
members of an emergency response team that will handle a natural disaster or attack. In
addition, the plan might include security measures for conducting drills to ensure that all
users and the emergency response team know what to do when a disaster or attack occurs.

Risk analysis and risk management are the two core parts of a network security policy. Other
parts in a typical network security policy could include a section specifying policy violation and
subsequent counter measures and a program to promote security awareness etc.

(3) An implementation of a simple network security policy in TRINETR

In TRINETR, a simple network security policy is implemented. The policy is primarily used to
aid the demonstration of how a security policy could be integrated in the knowledge-based
evaluation and security decision support process. For this purpose, a simple network security
policy with the above two key components: risk analysis and risk management are well enough.

Identifying the assets process is used in the evaluation of intrusion alerts. The idea is
straightforward: an attack targeting a critical server should be rated with higher priority than an
attack tampering with a personal computer; Risk Management is used in the security decision
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support process. The incidental handling schemes are pre-defined according to attack
classification, attack priority, target role and target impact level. Appropriate schemes are pulled
out after the evaluation process to facilitate security decision making.

In TRINETR’s current implementation, security policy is implemented as a database with two
tables: Assets and Response, corresponding to the two key components: Risk Analysis and Risk
Management..

Table 8 shows the field definitions of the Asset table in TRINETR’s security policy
implementation.
Table 8. Assets Table Field Definition

Field Name

Description

A_ID

A unique number to identify the asset

Security_level

Levels of classification of the asset

Impact_level

o Unclassified: Considered publicly accessible. There are no
requirements for access control or confidentiality.
o Shared: Resources that are shared within groups or with people
outside of the organization.
o Company Only: Access to be restricted to your internal employees
only.
o Confidential: Access to be restricted to a specific list of people. For
someone to have access to data or resources classified as
'Confidential' they must be cleared at this level and they must be
included in the access list for this resource. The owner of the object
(data or computer) is responsible for managing the access lists.
The relative importance level of the asset to the protected network

Role

The functionality provided by the asset

Address

The asset’s traceable address in the protected network.

120

The following table (Table 9) illustrates a sample Assets relation.
Table 9. A Sample Assets Table in TRINETR Network Security Policy

A_ID

Security_level

Impact_level

Role

Address

001

Shared

high

Web Server

192.168.0.102

002

Shared

high

FTP Server

192.168.0.103

003

Company

High

Database Server

192.168.0.104

004

Shared

low

Personal PC

192.168.1.108

The risk management is implemented as a Response relational table in TRINETR’s current
implementation. In this implementation, we are only interested in the incident handling and
response element because it is mainly this element that is used to facilitate security decision
making. Table 10 illustrates the field definitions of Response table.

Table 10. The Response Table Field Definition

Field

Description

R_ID

A unique number to identify the response

Threat

The classification of the threat

Threat_level

The priority of the threat

Asset

The target asset

Asset_impact_level

The impact level of the asset

Response

The incidental handling response

Table 11 provides a sample table of the Response relation.
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Table 11. A Sample Response Table in TRINETR Network Security Policy

R_ID

Threat

Threat_level

Asset

001

Buffer

high

Database High

Terminate Connection,

Server

Page System

Overflow

Asset_impact_level

Response

Administrator,
Apply solution, Log event
002

Buffer

medium

Overflow

Database High

Terminate Connection,

Server

Page System Admin,
Apply Solution, log event

003

Buffer

Low

Overflow
004

SCAN

Low

Database High

Terminate Connection,

Server

Log Event

Web

Medium

Server

Terminate connection,
Log Events

In this Response implementation, based on the target asset’s role and impact level, each threat is
assigned a response scheme according to its classification and priority. Therefore for threats
attacking the same target but with different priority or classification, each one is assigned a
different scheme. Symmetrically, for threats with the same classification and priority, they are
assigned different response scheme according to their target’s role and impact level. For instance,
in the above table, for any Buffer Overflow attack with high priority attacking a Database server
with high impact level, the response scheme includes: terminate the connection if still open, page
system administrator immediately, apply security solutions provided by the known vulnerability
solution knowledge base if available and log events. Another example, for any SCAN attack with
low priority tampering a Web Server with medium impact level, the response scheme only
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includes: terminate connection and log the event. System administrators need not to be paged at
this time.
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APPENDIX C: TRINETR System Programming
This appendix provides some of the source codes of TRINETR system programming. To save
space, many of the source codes listed here only contain the core segments of the original
programming. They are not provided to be compiled directly.

C.1 IDMEF Converter Agent for Snort
#!/usr/bin/perl -w
use strict;
use DBI;
package SnortIDMEFAgent;
sub hextooct;
##################################################
# Setup Database Connection
#
##################################################
my $snort_dbh=DBI->connect("DBI:mysql:snort","snortusr","snortpassword");
my $idmef_dbh=DBI->connect("DBI:mysql:IDMEF","idmef","idmefpassword");
my ($idmef_max_cid,$idmef_min_cid,$snort_max_cid);
my
($sid,$cid,$signature,$sig_name,$sig_class_id,$sig_priority,$timestamp,$ip_sr
c,$ip_dst,$ip_proto,$layer4_sport,$layer4_dport,$sig_class_name,$protocol,$re
f_id,$ref_seq,$ref_system_id,$ref_tag,$ref_system_name,$sig_sid);
my $count;
##################################################
# compare the latest alerts information
#
##################################################
my $snort_max_cid_sth=$snort_dbh->prepare(q{SELECT MAX(cid) FROM event});
my $idmef_min_cid_sth=$idmef_dbh->prepare(q{SELECT MIN(ident) FROM Alert});
##################################################
# retrieve information from snort database
#
##################################################
my $select_sql="SELECT event.sid,event.cid,signature, timestamp,
ip_src,ip_dst,ip_proto FROM event "."LEFT JOIN iphdr ON (event.sid=iphdr.sid
AND event.cid=iphdr.cid)"."WHERE event.cid>?";
my $sth2=$snort_dbh->prepare($select_sql);
my $select_tcp_port_sql="SELECT tcp_sport, tcp_dport FROM tcphdr WHERE cid=?";
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my $sth3=$snort_dbh->prepare($select_tcp_port_sql);
my $select_udp_port_sql="SELECT udp_sport, udp_dport FROM udphdr WHERE cid=?";
my $sth4=$snort_dbh->prepare($select_udp_port_sql);
my $select_signature_sql="SELECT sig_name, signature.sig_class_id,
sig_priority,sig_sid,sig_class.sig_class_name FROM signature "."LEFT JOIN
sig_class ON(sig_class.sig_class_id=signature.sig_class_id) "."WHERE
sig_id=?";
my $sth5=$snort_dbh->prepare($select_signature_sql);
my $select_sig_reference_sql="SELECT ref_id, ref_seq FROM sig_reference ".
"LEFT JOIN signature ON (sig_reference.sig_id=signature.sig_id) WHERE
signature.sig_sid=?";
my $sth6=$snort_dbh->prepare($select_sig_reference_sql);
my $select_reference_sql="SELECT ref_tag,reference_system.ref_system_name
from reference "."LEFT JOIN reference_system ON
(reference.ref_system_id=reference_system.ref_system_id) WHERE ref_id=?";
my $sth7=$snort_dbh->prepare($select_reference_sql);

#################################################
# insert information into idmef database
#
#################################################
my $insert_alert_sql="INSERT INTO Alert values(?)";
my $idmef_sth1=$idmef_dbh->prepare($insert_alert_sql);
my $insert_address_sql="INSERT INTO
Address(alert_ident,parent_type,category,address) values(?,?,?,?)";
my $idmef_sth2=$idmef_dbh->prepare($insert_address_sql);
my $insert_assessment_sql="INSERT INTO Assessment values(?)";
my $idmef_sth3=$idmef_dbh->prepare($insert_assessment_sql);
my $insert_classification_sql="INSERT INTO
Classification(alert_ident,origin,name,sig_sid) values(?,?,?,?)";
my $idmef_sth4=$idmef_dbh->prepare($insert_classification_sql);
my $insert_createtime_sql="INSERT INTO CreateTime values(?,?,?,?)";
my $idmef_sth5=$idmef_dbh->prepare($insert_createtime_sql);
my $insert_detecttime_sql="INSERT INTO DetectTime values(?,?,?)";
my $idmef_sth6=$idmef_dbh->prepare($insert_detecttime_sql);
my $insert_impact_sql="INSERT INTO Impact(alert_ident,description,severity)
values(?,?,?)";
my $idmef_sth7=$idmef_dbh->prepare($insert_impact_sql);
my $insert_service_sql="INSERT INTO
Service(alert_ident,parent_type,parent_ident,port,protocol)
values(?,?,?,?,?)";
my $idmef_sth8=$idmef_dbh->prepare($insert_service_sql);
my $insert_source_sql="INSERT INTO Source(alert_ident,ident) values(?,?)";
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my $idmef_sth9=$idmef_dbh->prepare($insert_source_sql);
my $insert_target_sql="INSERT INTO Target(alert_ident,ident) values(?,?)";
my $idmef_sth10=$idmef_dbh->prepare($insert_target_sql);

my $insert_sig_reference_sql="INSERT INTO
Sig_Reference(sig_sid,ref_id,ref_seq) values(?,?,?)";
my $idmef_sth11=$idmef_dbh->prepare($insert_sig_reference_sql);
my $select_idmef_sig_reference_sql="SELECT ref_id FROM Sig_Reference WHERE
sig_sid=? AND ref_seq=?";
my $check_idmef_sig_reference_sth=$idmef_dbh>prepare($select_idmef_sig_reference_sql);
my $check_idmef_reference_sql="SELECT ref_tag FROM Reference WHERE ref_id=?";
my $check_idmef_reference_sth=$idmef_dbh->prepare($check_idmef_reference_sql);
my $insert_reference_sql="INSERT INTO Reference(ref_id, ref_system,ref_tag)
values(?,?,?)";
my $idmef_sth12=$idmef_dbh->prepare($insert_reference_sql);
###################################################
#
#
#
Keep checking for new alerts
#
#
#
###################################################

$count=0;
while(1){
$snort_max_cid_sth->execute;
$snort_max_cid_sth->bind_columns(\$snort_max_cid);
$snort_max_cid_sth->fetch;
if(defined($snort_max_cid)){
print "SNORT MAX CID : $snort_max_cid\n";
}
else{
$snort_max_cid=0;
}
$idmef_min_cid_sth->execute;
$idmef_min_cid_sth->bind_columns(\$idmef_min_cid);
$idmef_min_cid_sth->fetch;
if(defined($idmef_min_cid)){
print "NO IDMEF MIN CID : $idmef_min_cid\n";
}
else{
$idmef_min_cid=0;
}
if ($idmef_min_cid>0){
$idmef_max_cid=0;
}
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else{
$idmef_max_cid=0-$idmef_min_cid;
}
if ($idmef_max_cid!= $snort_max_cid){
$sth2->execute($idmef_max_cid);
my @data;
###################################################
# fetch each row from snort sql statement results #
###################################################
while(@data=$sth2->fetchrow_array()){
$sid=$data[0];
$cid=$data[1];
$signature=$data[2];
$timestamp=$data[3];
$ip_src=$data[4];
$ip_dst=$data[5];
$ip_proto=$data[6];

if ($ip_proto == "6"){
$sth3->execute($cid);
$sth3->bind_columns(\$layer4_sport,\$layer4_dport);
$sth3->fetch;
$protocol="TCP";
}
elsif ( $ip_proto == "17" ){
$sth4->execute($cid);
$sth4->bind_columns(\$layer4_sport,\$layer4_dport);
$sth4->fetch;
$protocol="UDP";
}
elsif ($ip_proto =="1"){
$protocol="ICMP";
}
$sth5->execute($signature);
$sth5>bind_columns(\$sig_name,\$sig_class_id,\$sig_priority,\$sig_sid,\$sig_c
lass_name);
$sth5->fetch;
$sth6->execute($sig_sid);
###############################################
#
Check for signature reference
#
###############################################
while (my @ref_data=$sth6->fetchrow_array()){
$ref_id=$ref_data[0];
$ref_seq=$ref_data[1];
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my $duplicated;
$check_idmef_sig_reference_sth->execute($sig_sid,$ref_seq);
$check_idmef_sig_reference_sth->bind_columns(\$duplicated);
$check_idmef_sig_reference_sth->fetch;
if (! defined($duplicated)){
$idmef_sth11->execute($sig_sid,$ref_id,$ref_seq);
}
$sth7->execute($ref_id);
$sth7->bind_columns(\$ref_tag,\$ref_system_name);
$sth7->fetch;
my $exist;
$check_idmef_reference_sth->execute($ref_id);
$check_idmef_reference_sth->bind_columns(\$exist);
$check_idmef_reference_sth->fetch;
if(! defined($exist)){
$idmef_sth12->execute($ref_id,$ref_system_name,$ref_tag);
}

}

#############################################################
#
End of Check for signature reference
#
#############################################################

$count++;
$idmef_sth1->execute(-$cid);
$idmef_sth2->execute(-$cid,'S','ipv4-address',hextooct($ip_src));
$idmef_sth2->execute(-$cid,'T','ipv4-address',hextooct($ip_dst));
$idmef_sth3->execute(-$cid);
$idmef_sth4->execute(-$cid,$ref_system_name,$sig_class_name,$sig_sid);
$idmef_sth5->execute(-$cid,'A',$timestamp,"TEMP");
$idmef_sth6->execute(-$cid,$timestamp,"TEMP");
$idmef_sth8->execute(-$cid,'S',1,$layer4_sport,$protocol);
$idmef_sth8->execute(-$cid,'T',1,$layer4_dport,$protocol);
$idmef_sth9->execute(-$cid,1);
$idmef_sth10->execute(-$cid,1);
if($sig_priority eq 1)
{
$idmef_sth7->execute(-$cid,$sig_name,'low');
}
elsif($sig_priority eq 2)
{
$idmef_sth7->execute(-$cid,$sig_name,'medium');
}
else

128

{
$idmef_sth7->execute(-$cid,$sig_name,'high');
}
$ref_tag="";
$ref_system_name="";
}
$idmef_max_cid=$snort_max_cid;
}
else {
print "NO NEW ALERTS!!!\n";
}
sleep 4;
}
sub hextooct{
my ($oct1,$oct2,$oct3,$oct4,$hexip,$octip);
$hexip=shift;
$oct4=$hexip%256;
$oct3=(($hexip-$oct4)/256)%256;
$oct2=(($hexip-$oct4-$oct3*256)/256**2)%256;
$oct1=(($hexip-$oct4-$oct3*256-$oct2*256**2)/256**3)%256;
$octip=$oct1.".".$oct2.".".$oct3.".".$oct4;
return $octip;
}
exit;

C2. Alert Evaluation and Security Decision Support
C2.1 Program Main Portal
public class Eval
{
public static void main(String[] args) throws JessException
{
String fileName="facts.clp";
FileReader rulesFile;
Jesp jessParse;
String fact;
ReteControl reteControl=new ReteControl();
Rete reteEngine=reteControl.getRete();
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Connection idmef_conn=reteControl.get_idmefDB();
try{
rulesFile = new FileReader(fileName);
} catch (FileNotFoundException fnfe){
rulesFile=null;
}
///////////////////////////////////
//
Parse Rule Sets
//
///////////////////////////////////
if (rulesFile != null) {
jessParse = new Jesp(rulesFile, reteEngine);
try{
jessParse.parse(false);
}catch( JessException je){
}
try{
rulesFile.close();
}catch(Throwable exc) {
System.out.println(exc);}
reteEngine.run();
////////////////////////////////////
// Insert Alerts as Facts
//
////////////////////////////////////
try{
Statement alert_stmt = idmef_conn.createStatement();
ResultSet alert_rs=alert_stmt.executeQuery("SELECT * FROM Aggregation
where stable='Yes'");
Statement ref_stmt=idmef_conn.createStatement();
ResultSet ref_rs;
Statement none_priority_stmt=idmef_conn.createStatement();
ResultSet none_priority_rs;
int aid;
String source;
String target;
String sig_sid;
String last_time;
String ref;
String priority;
StringTokenizer sig_token;
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while(alert_rs.next()){
aid=alert_rs.getInt("aid");
source=alert_rs.getString("source");
target=alert_rs.getString("target");
sig_sid=alert_rs.getString("sig_sid");
time=alert_rs.getString(“timestampe”);
sig_token=new StringTokenizer(sig_sid,",");
while(sig_token.hasMoreTokens()){
String t=sig_token.nextToken();
ref_rs=ref_stmt.executeQuery("SELECT * FROM Reference LEFT JOIN
Sig_Reference ON (Reference.ref_id=Sig_Reference.ref_id) WHERE
(Sig_Reference.sig_sid="+t+")");

while(ref_rs.next()){
String ref_id=ref_rs.getString("ref_id");
String ref_system=ref_rs.getString("ref_system");
String ref_tag=ref_rs.getString("ref_tag");
ref+=ref_tag+"|";
}
}

fact="(alert (id "+aid+") (source "+source+") (target "+target+") time
"+time+") (ref "+"\""+ref+"\""+"))";
reteEngine.executeCommand("(assert "+fact+" )");
}
}
reteEngine.run();
}catch(SQLException re){re.printStackTrace();
}catch(JessException re){re.printStackTrace();}
}
}

}
C2.2 Rete Control Program
public class ReteControl
{
private
private
private
private

Rete reteEngine;
Connection hosts_conn;
Connection network_conn;
Connection idmef_conn;
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private Connection policy_conn;
public ReteControl(){
//////////////////////////////////
// Get Expert Engine Object
//
//////////////////////////////////
reteEngine=new Rete();
reteEngine.store("ReteControl", this);
try {
Class.forName("com.mysql.jdbc.Driver").newInstance();
} catch (Exception ex) {
ex.printStackTrace();
}
//////////////////////////////////
// Setup Database Connection
//
//////////////////////////////////
try {
hosts_conn=DriverManager.getConnection("jdbc:mysql://localhost/hosts?=user=id
mef&password=idmefpassword");
network_conn=DriverManager.getConnection("jdbc:mysql://localhost/network?=use
r=idmef&password=idmefpassword");
idmef_conn=DriverManager.getConnection("jdbc:mysql://localhost/IDMEF?=user=id
mef&password=idmefpassword");
policy_conn=DriverManager.getConnection("jdbc:mysql://localhost/SecurityPolic
y?=user=idmef&password=idmefpassword");
} catch (SQLException ex) {
}
}
public Rete getRete(){
return reteEngine;
}
public Connection get_hostsDB(){
return hosts_conn;
}
public Connection get_networkDB(){
return network_conn;
}
public Connection get_idmefDB(){
return idmef_conn;
}
public Connection get_policyDB(){
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return policy_conn;
}

}

C2.3 Vulnerability Knowledge Base ( part of facts.clp)
(deftemplate alert
"A specific alert"
(slot id)
(slot source)
(slot target)
(slot ref)
(slot time)
)
(deftemplate cve-ref
"CVE Vulerability Reference"
(slot ref_id)
(slot ref)
(slot os)
(slot version)
(slot solution)
(slot evaluate)
)
(deftemplate eval-ref
"Evaluate specific alert"
(slot alert_id)
(slot ref)
(slot target)
)
(deftemplate eval-result
"Alert Evaluation Result"
(slot alert_id)
(slot vulnerable)
(slot ref)
(slot solution)
(slot description)
)
(deffacts vulnerability "Vulnerability Knowledge Base"
(cve-ref (ref_id 001) (ref CVE-2001-0876) (os Windows) (version
"98|98SE|ME|XP Home|XP Professional") (solution
"HotfixQ314941|HotfixQ314941|HotfixQ314757|HotfixQ315000|HotfixQ315000"))
(cve-ref (ref_id 003) (ref CAN-2001-0341) (os Windows) (version
"4.0sp1|4.0sp2|5.0sp1|5.0sp3") (solution "Q311401|Q311401|fpse2k|fpse2k")
(evaluate CVE-2001-0341))
.
.
.
(cve-ref (ref_id 004) (ref CAN-2000-0429) (os Windows) (version
"4.10|4.90|4.0|5.0|5.1")(solution "Download patch") (evaluate CAN-2000-0429))
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(cve-ref (ref_id 005) (ref CAN-2000-0071) (os Windows) (version all)
(solution "Download patch") (evaluate CAN-2000-0071))
(cve-ref (ref_id 006) (ref CAN-2002-0012) (os Windows) (version
"4.00|4.10|4.0|4.0sp1|4.0sp2|4.0sp3|4.0sp4|4.0sp5|4.0sp6|4.0sp6a|5.0sp1|5.0sp
2") (solution "Download patch") (evaluate CAN-2002-0012))
(cve-ref (ref_id 007) (ref www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-19.html) (os
Windows) (version "4.0|5.0") (solution "http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA2001-19.html") (evaluate CA-2001-19))
(cve-ref (ref_id 007) (ref CAN-2003-0028) (os *nix) (version "") (solution
"http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/7123") (evaluate CAN-2003-0028))
.
.
.
.
.
.
)
(reset)

(defrule chech-ref
?fact <-(alert )
=>
(new checkRef "Check Vulnerability Reference"
?fact
(fetch "ReteControl")
)
)
(defrule eval-CAN-2000-0429
?fact <-(eval-ref (alert_id ?x)(ref CAN-2000-0429))
=>(new eval_CAN_2000_0429
?fact
(fetch "ReteControl")
)
)

(defrule eval-CAN-2000-0071
?fact <- (eval-ref (alert_id ?x) (ref CAN-2000-0071))
=>(new eval_CAN_2000_0071
?fact
(fetch "ReteControl")
)
)
(defrule eval-CAN-2002-0012
?fact <- (eval-ref (alert_id ?x) (ref CAN-2002-0012))
=>(new eval_CAN_2002_0012
?fact
(fetch "ReteControl")
)
)
(defrule eval-CA-2001-19
?fact <- (eval-ref (alert_id ?x) (ref www.cert.org/advisories/CA-200119.html))
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=>(new eval_CA_2001_19
?fact
(fetch "ReteControl")
)
)
(defrule eval-CAN-2003-0028
?fact <- (eval-ref (alert_id ?x) (ref CAN-2003-0028))
=>(new eval_CAN_2003_0028
?fact
(fetch "ReteControl")
)
)
(defrule eval-CVE-2001-0341
?fact <- (eval-ref (alert_id ?x) (ref CVE-2001-0341))
=>(new eval_CVE_2001_0341
?fact
(fetch "ReteControl")
)
)
.
.
.
.
.
.

(defrule decision
?result <-(eval-result (vulnerable ?x))
=>
(new finalDecision
?result
(fetch "ReteControl")
)
)

C2.4 A Typical Specific Evaluation Process
public class eval_CA_2001_19
{
private ReteControl reteControl;
private Connection network_conn;
private Connection hosts_conn;
private
private
private
private

int alert_id;
String target;
String web_server;
String version;

private boolean vulnerable;
private String target_osversion;
private String target_servicePack;
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private String startedService;

private String device;

public eval_CA_2001_19(Fact fact, ReteControl rete){

try{

reteControl=rete;
target=fact.getSlotValue("target").toString();
alert_id=
fact.getSlotValue("alert_id").intValue(rete.getRete().getGlobalContext());
vulnerable=evaluate();
if(!vulnerable){
String result="(eval-result (alert_id "+alert_id+" ) (vulnerable
no) (ref CA-2001-19) (description \"A system immune alert or false
positive\"))";
reteControl.getRete().executeCommand("(assert "+result+")");
}
else {
String result="(eval-result (alert_id "+alert_id+" ) (vulnerable
yes) (ref CA-2001-19) (description \"CERTÂ® Advisory CA-2001-19 \"Code Red\"
Worm Exploiting Buffer Overflow In IIS Indexing Service DLL\"))";
reteControl.getRete().executeCommand("(assert "+result+")");

}

}catch(JessException e){e.printStackTrace();}

}
///////////////////////////////////////
//
Evaluation Process
//
///////////////////////////////////////

public boolean evaluate(){
String target_os;
try{
network_conn=reteControl.get_networkDB();
Statement stmt = network_conn.createStatement();
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ResultSet rs=stmt.executeQuery("SELECT os,deviceType FROM host LEFT
JOIN address ON (address.host_id=host.host_id) WHERE
(address.address=\""+target+"\")");

while(rs.next()){
target_os=rs.getString("os");
device=rs.getString("deviceType");
}
if(device.equals("pc") & target_os.equals("windows")){
hosts_conn=reteControl.get_hostsDB();
Statement stmt2=hosts_conn.createStatement();
ResultSet rs2=stmt2.executeQuery("SELECT
osversion,service_pack,startedService from windows where
ipaddress=\""+target+"\"");
while(rs2.next()){
target_osversion=rs2.getString("osversion");
startedService=rs2.getString("startedService");
target_servicePack=rs2.getString("service_pack");
}
if(target_osversion.startsWith("5.0")){
Statement stmt3=network_conn.createStatement();
ResultSet rs3=stmt3.executeQuery("SELECT product, version FROM
port LEFT JOIN host,address ON (port.host_id=host.host_id AND
host.host_id=address.host_id) WHERE (address.address=\""+target+"\" AND
port.number=80)");
while(rs3.next()){
web_server=rs3.getString("product");
version=rs3.getString("version");
}
if(!web_server.startsWith("Microsoft IIS")){
return false;
}
else {
if(target_servicePack.endsWith("2")||target_servicePack.endsWith("3")){
return false;
}
else return true;
}
}else {
return false;
}
}
}catch(SQLException re){re.printStackTrace();}
return false;
}
}
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C2.5 Final Decision Program
public class finalDecision
{
private
private
private
private
private

ReteControl reteControl;
Rete reteEngine;
Fact myFact;
Connection idmefConn;
Connection policyConn;

private
private
private
private
private

int alert_id;
String ref;
String vulnerable;
String solution;
String description;

public finalDecision(Fact fact, ReteControl rete)
{
this.reteControl=rete;
this.reteEngine=rete.getRete();
this.myFact=fact;
try{
alert_id=myFact.getSlotValue("alert_id").intValue(rete.getRete().getGlobalCon
text());
ref=myFact.getSlotValue("ref").toString();
vulnerable=myFact.getSlotValue("vulnerable").toString();
solution=myFact.getSlotValue("solution").toString().substring(1,myFact.getSlo
tValue("solution").toString().length()-1);
if(solution.equals("i")){solution="";}
description=myFact.getSlotValue("description").toString().substring(1,myFact.
getSlotValue("description").toString().length()-1);
idmefConn=reteControl.get_idmefDB();
policyConn=reteControl.get_policyDB();
Statement stmt=idmefConn.createStatement();
String sql="UPDATE Aggregation SET vulnerability=\""+vulnerable+"\",
solution=\""+solution+"\", reference=\""+ref+"\",
description=\""+description+"\" WHERE aid="+alert_id;
int i=stmt.executeUpdate(sql);
if(vulnerable.equals("yes")){
inc_response();
}
}catch(SQLException e){e.printStackTrace();
}catch(JessException re){re.printStackTrace();}
}
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public String inc_response(){
String sql="SELECT * FROM Aggregation WHERE aid="+alert_id;
try{
Statement stmt=idmefConn.createStatement();
ResultSet rs=stmt.executeQuery(sql);
while(rs.next()){
String ip_tgt=rs.getString("target");
String priority=rs.getString("priority");
String classification=rs.getString("classification");
String sql2="SELECT * FROM Assets WHERE address=\""+ip_tgt+"\"";
Statement stmt2=policyConn.createStatement();
ResultSet rs2=stmt2.executeQuery(sql2);

while(rs2.next()){
String impact_level=rs2.getString("impact_level");
String type=rs2.getString("type");
String sql3="SELECT response FROM Response WHERE
asset=\""+type+"\" AND asset_impact_level=\""+impact_level+"\" AND
threat=\""+classification+"\" AND threat_level=\""+priority+"\"";
Statement stmt3=policyConn.createStatement();
ResultSet rs3=stmt3.executeQuery(sql3);
while(rs3.next()){
String response=rs3.getString("response");
String sql4="UPDATE Aggregation SET
incident_response=\""+response+"\" WHERE aid="+alert_id;
Statement stmt4=idmefConn.createStatement();
int j=stmt4.executeUpdate(sql4);
}
}
}
}catch(SQLException e){e.printStackTrace();}
return 1;
}
}

C3. GCT Programming
C3.1 Matrix Operation
package matrix;
use Exporter;
$VERSION=1.00;
@ISA=('Exporter');
@EXPORT =qw(matrix_multiply matrix_transpose matrix_inversion matrix_vector
matrix_count_rows_cols matrix_print);
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@EXPORT_OK=qw(matrix_print);

sub matrix_multiply {
my ($r_mat1, $r_mat2) = @_;
# Taking matrices by reference
my ($r_product);
# Returing product by reference
my ($i,$j,$k,$sum);
my ($r1, $c1) = matrix_count_rows_cols ($r_mat1);
my ($r2, $c2) = matrix_count_rows_cols ($r_mat2);

die "Matrix 1 has $c1 columns and matrix 2 has $r2 rows."
. " Cannot multiply\n" unless ($c1 == $r2);
for ($i = 0; $i < $r1; $i++) {
for ($j = 0; $j < $c2; $j++) {
$sum = 0;
for ($k = 0; $k < $c1; $k++) {
$sum += $r_mat1->[$i][$k] * $r_mat2->[$k][$j];
}
$r_product->[$i][$j] = $sum;
}
}
$r_product;
}
sub matrix_transpose{
my
my
my
my

($r_mat)=@_;
($r_transpose);
($r1, $c1) = matrix_count_rows_cols ($r_mat);
($i,$j);

my @temp;
$r_transpose=\@temp;

for($i=0;$i<$c1;$i++){
for($j=0;$j<$r1;$j++)
{$r_transpose->[$i][$j]=$r_mat->[$j][$i];}
}
return $r_transpose;
}

sub matrix_inversion {
my (@tobe_Inversed0)=@_;
my $size=@tobe_Inversed0;
my

$tobe_Inversed =\@tobe_Inversed0;

my

@matrix=@$tobe_Inversed;

my ($r_inversion);
my ($i,$j,$k,$factor);
my @temp;
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my @b;
for( $i=0;$i<$size;$i++){
for ($j=0;$j<$size;$j++)
{
if ($i==$j)
{ $b[$i][$j]=1;}
else {$b[$i][$j]=0;}
}
}
for ($i=0;$i<$size;$i++)
{
for ($j=$i+1;$j<$size;$j++)
{
if ( abs($matrix[$i][$i]) <
{

abs($matrix[$j][$i]))

@temp= @$matrix[$i];
@$matrix[$i]=@$matrix[$j];
@$matrix[$j]=@temp;
@temp=@$b[$i];
@$b[$i]=@$b[$j];
@$b[$j]=@temp;
}
}
if ($matrix[$i][$i]==0) {last;}
$factor=$matrix[$i][$i];
for ($j=$size-1;$j>=0;$j--)
{
$b[$i][$j]=$b[$i][$j]/$factor;
$matrix[$i][$j]=$matrix[$i][$j]/$factor;
}
for($j=$i+1;$j<$size;$j++)
{
$factor=-$matrix[$j][$i];
for($k=0;$k<$size;$k++)
{
$matrix[$j][$k]=$matrix[$j][$k]+$matrix[$i][$k]*$factor;
$b[$j][$k]=$b[$j][$k]+$b[$i][$k]*$factor;
}
}
}
for($i=$size-1;$i>=1;$i--)
{
for($j=$i-1;$j>=0;$j--)
{
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$factor=-$matrix[$j][$i];
for ($k=0;$k<$size;$k++)
{
$matrix[$j][$k]=$matrix[$j][$k]+$matrix[$i][$k]*$factor;
$b[$j][$k]=$b[$j][$k]+$b[$i][$k]*$factor;
}
}
}
@matrix=@b;
$r_inversion=\@matrix;
$r_inversion;
}

sub

matrix_vector{
my ($mat, $vec)=@_;
my ($m, $n)=matrix_count_rows_cols($mat);
my $d=@$vec;
my @c;
die "Cannot multipy matrix and vector" unless ($d==$n);

for(my $i=0;$i<$m;$i++){
for($k=0;$k<$n;$k++){
$c[$i]+=($mat->[$i][$k])*($vec->[$k]);
}
}
my $r=\@c;
$r;
}

sub matrix_count_rows_cols {
my ($r_mat) = @_;
my $num_rows = @$r_mat;
my $num_cols = @{$r_mat->[0]};
($num_rows, $num_cols);
}
1;
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C3.2 GCT Computation
package gct;

use DBI;
use DateTime;
use matrix;
use Exporter;
$VERSION=1.00;
@ISA=('Exporter');
@EXPORT=qw(DDOS_time_series_formulation DDOS_time_series_formulation_2
time_series_formulation matrix_formulation y_vector ARMA_matrix_formulation
DDOS_first_last_time first_last_time dest_src_alert_count residual
sum_residual_square GCT hextooct parseTime);
@EXPORT_OK=qw();

##################################################
# Setup Database Connection
#
##################################################

my $snort_dbh=DBI->connect("DBI:mysql:snort","snortusr","snortpassword");

my $first_last_time_sql="SELECT timestamp FROM acid_event where (ip_dst=?
and ip_src=?)";
my $first_last_time_sth=$snort_dbh->prepare($first_last_time_sql);
my $DDOS_first_last_time_sql="SELECT timestamp FROM acid_event where
(ip_dst=?)";
my $DDOS_first_last_time_sth=$snort_dbh->prepare($DDOS_first_last_time_sql);

my $dest_src_alert_count_sql="SELECT * FROM acid_event where (ip_dst=? and
ip_src=?)";
my $dest_src_alert_count_sth=$snort_dbh->prepare($dest_src_alert_count_sql);

my $formulation_sql="SELECT * FROM acid_event where (ip_dst=? and ip_src=?
and signature=?)";
my $formulation_sth=$snort_dbh->prepare($formulation_sql);
my $DDOS_formulation_sql="SELECT * FROM acid_event where (ip_dst=? and
signature=?)";
my $DDOS_formulation_sth=$snort_dbh->prepare($DDOS_formulation_sql);

my $cid;
my @dest_data;
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my
my
my
my

@src_data;
@alert_data;
@time_data;
@data3;

my
my
my
my
my
my
my
my
my
my
my
my

$dest_count=0;
$src_count=0;
$count2=0;
$count3=0;
$count4=0;
$count5=0;
$alert_count=0;
$first=0;
$fTime;
$lTime;
($dest_ip, $src_ip);
@slot;

sub DDOS_time_series_formulation($$)
{
my ($dest,$signature)=(shift,shift);
my $dest_ip=hextooct($dest);
my @time_data=DDOS_first_last_time($dest);
my $firstTime=$time_data[0];
my @slot;
my @alert_count;
my $i=0;
while($firstTime<=$time_data[1]){
$slot[$i]=$firstTime->ymd." ".$firstTime->hms;
$alert_count[$i]=0;
$i++;
$firstTime=$firstTime->add(seconds=>60);
} #end of while loop
$DDOS_formulation_sth->execute($dest,$signature);
while (my @data=$DDOS_formulation_sth->fetchrow_array()){
my $timestamp=parseTime($data[6]);
for($i=0;$i<@slot;$i++){
if (($timestamp>=(parseTime($slot[$i]))) &&
($timestamp<(parseTime($slot[$i])->add(seconds=>60)))){
$alert_count[$i]++;
}
}
}
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return (\@alert_count);

}

sub time_series_formulation($$$)
{
my ($dest, $src, $signature)=(shift,shift,shift);
my $dest_ip=hextooct($dest);
my $src_ip=hextooct($src);
my @time_data=first_last_time($dest,$src);
my $firstTime=$time_data[0];
my @slot;
my @alert_count;
my $i=0;
while($firstTime<=$time_data[1]){
$slot[$i]=$firstTime->ymd." ".$firstTime->hms;
$alert_count[$i]=0;
$i++;
$firstTime=$firstTime->add(seconds=>60);

}
$formulation_sth->execute($dest,$src,$signature);
while (my @data=$formulation_sth->fetchrow_array()){
my $timestamp=parseTime($data[6]);
for($i=0;$i<@slot;$i++){
if (($timestamp>=(parseTime($slot[$i]))) &&
($timestamp<(parseTime($slot[$i])->add(seconds=>60)))){
$alert_count[$i]++;
}
}
}
return (\@alert_count);

}
sub matrix_formulation{
my ($alert_count,$p)=@_;
my $size=@$alert_count;
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my @matrix;
my $r_matrix=\@matrix;
my $i;
for($i=0;$i<=$p;$i++){
for(my $j=0;$j<$size-$p;$j++){
if($i==0){$r_matrix->[$j][$i]=1;}
else{
$r_matrix->[$j][$i]=$alert_count->[$p-$i+$j];
}
}
}
my @y;
my $r_y=\@y;
return $r_matrix;
}
sub y_vector{
my ($alert_count,$p)=@_;
my @y;
for(my $i=0;$i<@$alert_count-$p;$i++){
$y[$i]=$alert_count->[$i+$p];
}
return \@y;
}

sub ARMA_matrix_formulation{
my ($x,$y,$p)=@_;
my @arma_matrix;
my ($i,$j);
die "Matrix sizes not equal" unless (@$x == @$y);
my $size=@$x;
for($i=0;$i<=$p;$i++){
for($j=0;$j<$size-$p;$j++){
if($i==0){$arma_matrix[$j][$i]=1;}
else{
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$arma_matrix[$j][$i]=$x->[$p-$i+$j];
$arma_matrix[$j][$i+$p]=$y->[$p-$i+$j];
}
}
}
return \@arma_matrix;
}
sub dest_src_alert_count($$){
my ($target, $source)=(shift,shift);
my $count=0;
$dest_src_alert_count_sth->execute($target,$source);
while (my @count=$dest_src_alert_count_sth->fetchrow_array()){
$count++;
}
return $count;
}

sub DDOS_first_last_time($)
{
my ($target)=(shift);
my
my
my
my
my
my
my

$time_data;
$timestamp;
($firstTime, $lastTime);
($fTime, $lTime);
$first=0;
@time;
@time_data;

$DDOS_first_last_time_sth->execute($target);
while(@time_data=$DDOS_first_last_time_sth->fetchrow_array()){
$timeStamp=$time_data[0];
my $time=parseTime($timeStamp);
if ($first==0) { $fTime=$timeStamp; $lTime=$timeStamp;
$firstTime=$time; $lastTime=$time; }
else {
if ( $firstTime > $time) {

$fTime=$timeStamp;

$firstTime=$time; }
if ( $lastTime < $time ) {
$lastTime=$time;

}
}
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$lTime=$timeStamp;

$first++;
}
$time[0]=$firstTime;
$time[1]=$lastTime;
$time[2]=$fTime;
$time[3]=$lTime;
return @time;
}

sub first_last_time($$)
{
my ($target, $source)=(shift,shift);
my
my
my
my
my
my
my

$time_data;
$timestamp;
($firstTime, $lastTime);
($fTime, $lTime);
$first=0;
@time;
@time_data;

$first_last_time_sth->execute($target,$source);
while(@time_data=$first_last_time_sth->fetchrow_array()){
$timeStamp=$time_data[0];
my $time=parseTime($timeStamp);
if ($first==0) { $fTime=$timeStamp; $lTime=$timeStamp;
$firstTime=$time; $lastTime=$time; }
else {
if ( $firstTime > $time) {

$fTime=$timeStamp;

$firstTime=$time; }
if ( $lastTime < $time ) {
$lastTime=$time;

}
}
$first++;

}
$time[0]=$firstTime;
$time[1]=$lastTime;
$time[2]=$fTime;
$time[3]=$lTime;
return @time;
}
sub OLS_estimator{
my ($x,$y)=@_;
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$lTime=$timeStamp;

my $x1;
$x1=matrix_transpose($x);
my $beta;
my $x1x=matrix_multiply($x1,$x);
my @temp=@$x1x;
my $x1x_inversion=matrix_inversion(@temp);
my $x1x_inversion_times_x1=matrix_multiply($x1x_inversion,$x1);
$beta=matrix_vector($x1x_inversion_times_x1,$y);
$beta;
}

sub residual{
my ($x,$y)=@_;
my @temp;
my $b=\@temp;
$b=OLS_estimator($x,$y);
my @residual;
my $product;
$product=matrix_vector($x,$b);

for( my $i=0;$i<@$x;$i++){
$residual[$i]=$y->[$i]-($product->[$i]);
}
\@residual;
}
sub sum_residual_square{
my ($r)=@_;
$sum=0;
for(my $i=0;$i<@$r;$i++){
$sum+=(($r->[$i])**2);
}
$sum;
}
sub GCT{
my ($r0,$r1,$t,$p)=@_;
my $g;
if( ($r1!=0) && (($t-2*$p-1)!=0)){
$g=(($r0-$r1)/$p)/($r1/($t-2*$p-1));
}
else{
$g=99999999999999;
}
$g;
}
sub hextooct{
my ($oct1,$oct2,$oct3,$oct4,$hexip,$octip);
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$hexip=shift;
$oct4=$hexip%256;
$oct3=(($hexip-$oct4)/256)%256;
$oct2=(($hexip-$oct4-$oct3*256)/256**2)%256;
$oct1=(($hexip-$oct4-$oct3*256-$oct2*256**2)/256**3)%256;
$octip=$oct1.".".$oct2.".".$oct3.".".$oct4;
return $octip;
}
sub parseTime($)
{
my $gm=shift;
my @gmTime=split(/\ /,$gm);
my @date=split(/-/,$gmTime[0]);
my @time=split(/:/,$gmTime[1]);
my $dt=DateTime>new(year=>$date[0],month=>$date[1],day=>$date[2],hour=>$time[0],minute=>$tim
e[1],second=>$time[2],);
return $dt;
}
1;
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